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C O N T E N T S
PREFACE
The primary objective of the sub-ethesis is
to assess the development of relations between Iran 
and the Soviet Union since the revolution in Iran.
In early 1979, the Iranian revolution brought an 
Islamic goverhment into power. The anti-US slogans 
of the new government and its complete withdrawal 
from total dependence on the United States, along with 
the chaotic situation within Iran, made it vulnerable 
to outside interference.
invasion of Afghanistan posed security problems for 
Iran. The new government responded cautiously and 
slowly to this development. Internally, the power 
struggle among the Islamic fundamentalists, the Islamic 
moderates and the various leftist groups conditioned 
the relations between Iran and the Soviet Union as they 
evolved over the period. A 'reasonable working rela­
tionship' developed between the two countries despite 
the ideological differences. *
put immense pressure on Iran's resources. Iran's 
mission v/as as much ideological as it was military.
to Other countries, especially in the Gulf. The Iran- 
Con U'nueSIraq war co^ n-tgicS' till the time of this writing. Iran 
is being helped in its war with Iraq indirectly by 
the Soviet Union, which is also assisting Iraq.
A major break developed in the Iranian-Soviet 
relations with the banning of the Tudeh party and the 
expulsion of Soviet^ d<fcplomat«s from Iran.
On the other hand, in late 1979, the Soviet
The war between Iran and Iraq provided a test 
for Soviet policy towards the two Gulf countries. It
The Islamic regime had vowed
( ii )
Hence, in the duration from February 1979 until 
March 1984, various issues have judged the extent of 
'mutual interest' of the two countries. For the purpose 
of explaining these relations, the sub-thesis is divided 
into five chapters.
The first chapter would provide the background 
and trace the history of Iran's relations with the Soviet 
Union (roughly) since the Boshevik revolution until the 
period of Mohammed Reza Shah.
Chapter two will serve as a background to the 
1979 revolution in Iran. It will cover the period of 
Iran's relations with the Soviet Union from th<^5oviet ^
military intervention in Afghanistan.
The third chapter discusses, Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan and its effect on the Iranian-Soviet rela­
tion. The period covered in this chapter is from December 
1979 until September 1980.
The fourth chapter analyses Iran's differences with 
Iraq and the consequent war between the two countries.
Iran's relations with Soviet Union since the start of the 
wqr until March 1983 when the Tudeh was banned and from 
then on an assessment is made of the pattern of their 
relations until March 1984.
The final chapter shall form the conclusion of the 
sub-thesis, providing a brief overview of the Iranian- 
Soviet relations and an analysis of the tread of their 
relationship.
I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Geoffrey 
Jukes without whose invaluable guidance and help this work 
would not have been completed. I would also like to
( iii )
thank Dr. Amin Saikal and Dr. James Piscatori 
for their valued comments and supervision. Special 
gratitude is due to Ms. Shirley Steer for her 




The Iranian-Soviet  re la t io n s  have developed on the 
bas is  o f  c u l tu r a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  m il i tary  and economic 
in teract iono  The commercial r e la t ion s  between the two 
countries  commenced during the reign o f  Ivan the Terrible  
•These re la t ion s  were conducted on an equal basis  un­
regulated by any rule or convention1* „ ^
The emergence o f  Peter the Great (1582 -  1725) led 
to Russian m i l i ta ry  expansion into  the northern areas of  
the Persian empire. Nadir Shah conducted a n  aggressive 
Persian p o l i c y  towards Russia. By the Treaty o f  Resht 
in 1732 and the Treaty o f  Ganjeh in 1735 Persia appeared 
to have regained some p r e s t ig e .  But under Katherine 
(1762-96) and Nicholas I (1825-55) Russia once again 
emerged powerful.  In 1796 and 1301 Persia met with 
de feat  by Russia a f te r  which many t re a t ie s  were signed 
between the two countr ies .  On these t r e a t i e s ,  the Treaty 
of  Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty o f  Turkmanchai (1828) 
established a sp e c ia l  status and an area o f  ju r i s d i c t i o n  
f o r  Russia in Iranian a f f a i r s .  An important aspect o f  
Iranian-Soviet  re la t ions  which set  the pace f o r  Soviet  
dominance in Iran were the p o l i t i co -e co n o m ic  re la t ions  
between the two countr ies .  In 1888, the Transcaspian 
railway line was constructed .  A Russian naval base was 
estab l ished  at Ashurda, alongwith the s e t t in g  up of  a 
Persian 6ossack Brigade3 with Russian ass is ta n ce .  Russia 
further  extended i t s  economic dominance over Iran through 
the Treaty o f  ISrzuriy? in 1903o
The id e o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r  was introduced into the
Iranian-Soviet  re la t ion s  with the s e t t in g  up o f  a Republi
in the Soviet  Union a f t e r  the 1917 Bolshevik revo lut ion .
The new government faced the problem o f  pursuing a p o l i cy
o f  e i th er  preserving i t s  i d e o l o g i c a l  in teres ts  or the
state in t e r e s t .  The post -revo lu t ionary  Sov iet  Government
supported the new regime o f  Reza Shah and declared Iran 
b&to a semi-bourgeois  s ta te .  Ideology,  th e re fo re ,  was not 
the dominant fa c t o r  in Iran-Soviet  r e la t i o n s .  Iran's  
r e la t ion s  with the Soviet  Union progressed smoothly 
during Reza Khan's period on the basis o f  1921 Treaty 
o f  Friendship and the 1927 Treaty o f  Neutral ity  as well  
a3 the economic agreemen ts 1935*
• o 2
2ANGLO -  3OVIST RIVALRY
Iran 's  s t r a te g i c  lo ca t ion  has had deep p o l i t i c a l
consequences. I t  has attracted fo r e ig n  powers l ike
S ov ie t  Union and Great Brita in  in the eighteenth and
the nineteenth century and the United s ta tes  since the
i\juL
mid-twentieth century0 The Soviet  Union had. a history  
o f  keen in te r e s t  in the region south o f  i t s  border,, Since 
the middle o f  the eighteenth century Anglo-Soviet  r iv a l r y  
dominated the p o l i t i e s  o f  Persia .  Iran being s t r a t e g i c a l l y  
located  between -Europe and Asia also came within the 
geographical  perimeters o f  Russian se cu r i ty .  Soviet  
in te r e s t  in Iran clashed with B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l  expansion 
in the region o f  the subcontinent as Iran f e l l  within the 
B r i t i s h  imperial  l ines  o f  communication J f  Iran maintained 
i t s  id ent ity  even though the fo re ign  powers constantly 
in ter fered  in i t s  domestic a f f a i r s  and undermined i t s  
sovere ig n ty .
D irec t  Soviet  involvement in Iran dates from the 
early nineteenth century when in 1801 the Czarist  troops 
annexed Georgia and a part o f  Azerbaijan. In 1813» by 
the trea ty  o f  Gulistan, the Czar estab l ished  his 
dominance in the region o f  the Caucasus and even gained 
economic advantages in Iran. By 1828, Iran, a f te r  
further  mismanagement o f  i t s  a f f a i r s  by the Qaj ar kings 
had to y ie ld  even more t e r r i t o r y  and economic concessions 
to the Russians« The 1828 Treaty of  Turkmanchay 
established the present boundary l ine  between Iran andfC
the Soviet  Union.
The Anglo-Soviet  struggle  f o r  influence in Iran 
continued over the per iod .  In 1907 the Anglo-Russ ian 
convention was s igred in which the two powers ca l le d  f o r  
the d iv is io n  o f  Iran into  spheres o f  in f lu ence .  Russia 
acquired the northern part whereas Brita in extended 
i t s  influence beyond the subcontinent a l l  the way to 
the southern part  o f  Iran. A neutral  zone lay in the 
middle 0
During World war I these two r iv a ls  came together 
against a common enemy, Germany. They occupied Iran.
In the struggle  that started in Iran, between the Turks 
and Russians in the north-west o f  Iran, and the Qashqai
o « 3
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and Bakhtiari  r e v o l t  against the B r i t i sh  in the south, 
Br ita in  emerged strowiger in contrast  to a weakened 
Sov iet  p o s i t i o n . ^  The Bolshevik revolut ion  in Russia 
needed to consolidate  i t s  p o s i t io n ,  hence the new 
leaders sought to  have a reasonable externa l  environ­
ment. In 1919 the B r i t i s h  had attempted to bring Iran 
under i t s  t o t a l  dominance by o f f e r in g  an Anglo-Persian 
t rea ty .  The Iranian M ajl is  did not r a t i f y  the trea ty .
At that time the Soviet f -supported  r e b e l l i o n  in 
Azerbaijan forced the B r i t i s h  to r e trea t  and the B r it ish  
weakness became apparent. The Bolsheviks, t h e r e fo r e , did 
not want to provide any pretext  f o r  fu r th er  B r it ish  
expansion in Iran.
On February 26, 1921, Russia signed a Treaty of
Friendship with Iran which was formally r a t i f i e d  by the
Majl is  in December that year .  ' I t  declared a l l  Czarist
claims on Iran based on the Anglo-Russian Agreement o f
n
1907 and other accords to be n u l l  and v o i d ' .  '
The fo l lo w in g  a r t i c l e s  (V and VI) were e sp ec ia l ly  
important f o r  de f in ing  Sov ie t -Iran ia n  re la t io n s  in 1941 
and in the post  World War I I  period :
Under A r t ic le  V the two p a rt ies  undertook to 
p roh ib it  the formation or presence within the ir  respect ive  
t e r r i t o r i e s  of  any organ isat ion  or groups o f  persons 
whose o b je c t  is  to engage in acts of  h o s t i l i t y  against 
Persia or Russia or against the a l l i e s  o f  Russia. Not to 
allow the import or to convey in t ra n s i t  across their  
countr ies  m ateria l  which can be used against  the other 
party.
A r t ic le  VI st ipulated  that i f  a third party should 
des ire  to use Persian t e r r i t o r y  against Russia, and i f  
the Persian government should not be able to put a stopvtperv
to such a menace a f te r  having being once ca l led  'to do so 
by Russia, Russia sha l l  have the r ight  to defend i t s e l f 0 
It may advance i t s  troops into  the Persian t e r r i t o r y  f o r  
this  purpose, but undertakes to withdraw her troops from 




Russia a lso  withdrew i t s  support from the puppet 
S ov ie t  Republic o f  Gilan. To lay the foundations f o r  i t s  
future in f luence ,  Russia sponsored the establishment o f  
a pro-Moscow Iranian Communist group, which la te r  led to 
the development o f  the Iranian Communist party ,  ca l led  
Tudeh ( 'masses ' )  9
The coup in 1925 led by Reza Shah l iquidated  the rule 
o f  the Qajar dynasty. Re&a Shah was crowned as the Shah 
o f  Iran in 1926. Normalization o f  re la t ion s  with the 
Sov ie t  Union took place one year la te r  when in 1927, Reza 
Shah signed a treaty  of  guarantee and n e u t r a l i t y  with 
Russia.i^His determination to br ing  about a balance in 
the Sov iet  and B r i t i s h  influence in Iran made him d iv e r s i f y  
his sources o f  expertise  and te ch n ica l  ass is tan ce .  He 
looked fo r  such assistance from France, Germany, the 
United States, Austria and China.^
Reza Shah a lso  strove to ga in  more c o n t ro l  o f  Iran's  
o i l  revenues. He demanded more concessions from the 
B r i t i s h .  In the struggle  that  ensued, B r i ta in ,  through 
i t s  show of  stre*flgth, was able to retain i t s  monopoly o f  
the Iranian o i l  industry. This showdown with Britain led 
to improved re la t io n s  with the Soviet  Union. *<2.
During the Second World War the Soviet Union was 
invaded by Germanyc Under the A l l ied  agreement Britain 
came to the rescue by providing arms to the Sov iet  Union 
through Iran. Though Reza Shah had declared n e u tra l i ty  
in the war, he was over ruled by the two powers,, 
Subsequently, Br ita in  and Sov iet  Union occupied Iran and 
placed i t s  sovereignty p r o v is io n a l ly  under t h e i r  j o in t  
p r o t e c t i o n c Iran, there fo re ,  could not conduct i ts  
domestic and fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  and Reza Shah v/as forced to 
abdicate in fa v o u r  o f  his son Mohammed Reza Shah.A3
A T r ipar t i te  Treaty o f  a l l ia nce  was signed on 
January 29, 1942 whereby Russia and Britain agreed to 
withdraw the a l l i e d  fo r ce s  from Iran whthin s ix  months 
o f  the c lose  o f  the war. When the war was over both 
B rita in  and the Soviet  Union sought to minimise each 
o t h e r 's  in f luence in Iran. Stalin  began the 
'S o v ie t i z a t i o n '  o f  Iran by strengthening Soviet
5
f o r c e s  in the occupied prov inces .  The Soviet  union 
supported the sepa ra t is t  r e v o l t s  in Iran and undertook 
measures to b r in g  about socio-economic  changes in the 
northern provinces  of Iran which were under th e ir  contro l«
The Soviet  Union a lso  strengthened the Tudeh which had been 
banned by Reza Shah in 1937. The Tudeh party estab l ished  the 
Autonomous Republic o f  Azerbaijan under Jafar Pishevarfc 
and the Kurdish Democratic party proclaimed Kurdish 
autonomy in Mqjiab ad Needless to say that  the Soviet  
Union supported these newly autonomous s ta te s .  Also 
during this  period ,  the Soviet  Union pressed Iran fo r  o i l  
concession in order to set  up a j o i n t  Iranian-Soviet  o i l  
company on the pattern o f  the Iranian concessions 
conceded to  B r i ta in .
The reviv ing  of  Tudeh made the B r i t i s h  encourage a n t i ­
communist part ies  l ike  the ¿Jflrade ye M i l l i  (National W i l l ) ,
The formation o f  pro-Western p o l i t i c a l  part ies  fu e l le d  the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  Anglo-Soviet  r i v a l r y .
In the meantime, the changing in terna t iona l  context 
witnessed the dec l in in g  B r i t i s h  influence» America came to 
replace Brita in  and included Iran in i t s  'New Deal'  p o l i c y  
to oppose the Soviet  Union0
During the o i l  c r i s e s  o f  1944 the Soviet  Union 
demanded o i l  concessions from Iran in competition with the 
United States and B r ita in .  Due to the presence in the 
Majl is  o f  strong n a t io n a l i s t s  l ike  Mohammed Mossadeq, a 
b i l l  was passed postponing any o i l  concessions u n t i l  the 
end o f  the war. This made the Iranian government an 
ob je c t  of  c r i t i c i s m  from the ,Sov ie t  Union and the Tudeh: 
party .  Relations between the two countries  further  cooled 
down when the Soviet  Union refused to withdraw i t s  army 
from the Iranian s o i l .  This was against the T r ip ar t i te  
treaty  o b l ig a t io n s  and the matter was referred to the 
United Nations Security  Council.  F ina l ly  in May 1946, as 
a resu lt  o f  the understanding reached with Prime Minister  
Qavam and the S ov ie t  government, Soviet  troops evacuated 
Iran. \S
Trade r e la t io n s  between Iran and the’ Sov iet  Union 
during this  period were n e g l ig ib le  and the Tudeh was out­
lawed in 1949 when an attempt was made on the Shah's l i f e 0
. 06
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The Iranian M aj l is ,  led by Mossadeq, also took a very 
independent posture when i t  decided to s top a l l  preferen­
t i a l  treatment to any o f  the fore ign  countr ies .  As a 
resu lt  of  Soviet  h o s t i l i t y  and Mossadeq1s increasing 
authority ,  the Shah turned toward the United States  f o r  
supporto /6
Hence,( the vain attempts o f  the d i s in te g ra t iv e  move­
ment of  ethnic  m in o r i t ie s ,  the fa i lu re  o f  a la rger  
communist movement to share in power, and the s u cce ss fu l  
use o f  Iranian parliamentary and co n s t i tu t i o n a l  procedures 
to check Soviet  goals  combined to impose a cautious and 
rather conservative att itude on the USSR.3 I I
Mohd o Reza Shah had driven Iran into an a l l ia nce  
with America in order to balance the threat from a 
proximate super power. For a decade (1953“ &2) he linked 
the secur ity  o f  Iran with that o f  the Western world by 
j o in in g  the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and signed a b i l a t e r a l  
hr mutual s ecu r ity  pact with the United States in March 
1959. Iran 's  entry into the pact, ended i t s  o f f i c i a l l y  
proclaimed p o l i c y  of  n e u tra l i ty  and even handedness 
between East and West, and i t  now became integrated into 
the Western camp.^ This a l l ia n ce  became an important 
instrument and issue in Iran 's  re la t ion s  with the ° o v i e t  
Union«, But the ¿hah ¿Iid not allow re la t io n s  with the 
Soviet  Union to get to a po int  of  no return» He 
f irmly  withstood pressure from the Soviet Union against 
I ran 's  Western a l l i a n c e ,  but at the same time kept the 
option open fo r  good r e la t io n s  with i t 0
In 1953, a f t e r  S t a l in 's  death, the Soviet  government
made attempts to normalise r e la t io n s  with Iran» The Sov iet
Union in i t ia t e d  negot ia t ions  on the unsettled boundary
problems as w e l l  as the f i n a n c i a l  claims that had arisen
due to World War I I .  As a r e s u l t ,  p ro to co ls  were signed 
iq
in March 1954 and a treaty  regarding Iran ian-Soviet  
border issue was signed in May 1957.2<>
The Soviet  p o l i c y  o f  peacefu l  coexistence found a 
favourable resporca from Iran. The Shah and ShahbanotoL paid 
a state v i s i t  to the Soviet  Union in 1956 and a de legat ion  
o f  Iranian Majlis  also v i s i t e d  the USSR in the same year.-2-!
o o •
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Tn the early 1960s, due to changed in terna t iona l  
environment, there occured a dramatic change in Iranian 
S ov ie t  r e la t io n s .  The emergence of  the S ino-Soviet  
dispute engaged the S 0v i e t  Union at other points  o f  i t s  
Asian border. In the background o f  a tU.au; in the 
co ld  war and the rapid development o f  technology, 
the Soviet  Union sought to counter the Chinest threat 
by improving re la t io n s  with i t s  southern neighbour.
The Shah, on the other hand, wanted to.make the 
most o f  the opportunity that had arisen due to the 
detente in super power r e la t i o n s .  He was motivated 
into b e t te r  t i e s  with Moscow with the change in leader ­
ship  in the United States.  The new Kennedy administra­
tors expected the Shah to l i b e r a l i s e  his  government 
and bring about the necessary socio-economic  changes. 
Also the termination of defense support underscored % 
th e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  in p e r s p e c t iv e , Le st  Iran be l e f t  
on i t s  own by an agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet  Union, the Shah acted to normalise 
re la t ion s  with Russia .
Given the circumstances, the Sov ie t  Union found 
the opportunity to demonstrate to Iran the advantages 
o f  having a c lose  economic and p o l i t i c a l  r e la t ion sh ip  
with a resource fu l  neighbour. This was best  i l l u s t r a t ­
ed by the growth in trade between the two countr ies  
which increased tenfold  during the period 1966 -  1 9 7 3 »
The period from 1962 to 1968 3aw the Iranian- 
Soviet  r e la t io n s  progress smoothly0 The Soviet  Union 
was ca re fu l  t o  maintain good re la t ion s  with Iran» The 
two countries  entered into an economic agreement f o r  
the construct ion  of  two dams and one h y d ro e le c t r i c  
power s ta t ion  on the Aras River in I 9 6 3 ÍP The Dhah 
v i s i t e d  Moscow from June 21 to July 3, 1965o Two 
major economic and m il i tary  agreements were s igned0 
The f i r s t  was concluded in January 19660 Iran was to 
supply the S ov ie t  Union with more than $ 600 m i l l i on  
worth o f  natural gas beginning in 1970, in return,  the 
U,S,S,R. undertook to build Iran 's  f i r s t  large s t r e e l  
M i l l  complex in Isfahan^ construct  a gas p ipe l ine  from 
northern Iran to the Caucasus, and e s ta b l i s h  a machine 
t o o l  plant in Shiraz.  Under the second agreement,
8in i t ia t e d  in Feb ruary 1967» the Sov ie ts  agreed to supply 
Tehran with sDme $ 110 m i l l i on  worth o f  armoured troop 
carriers ' ,  trucks, and a n t i - a i r c r a f t  guns in return fo r  
natural  gas from Iran.*^
In 1962, the Shah of  Iran had launched a programme of  
Socio-economic reforms ca l le d  the ’ white R e v o lu t i o n ' .
The 2 6 th January,1963 referendum on the reforms proposed 
by the Iranian government received favourable Sov iet  
comments, s tress ing  that a majority  of  the Iranians 
favoured the at Shahs' proposa ls . ' The reactionary fo r c e s  -  
the large landholders, supported by the reactionary c lergy- 
v i o l e n t ly  opposed the land reforms? S'oviet commentators 
saw the reform as an advance from fendalism to capita lism, 
a strenghenning o f  the pro le tar ian  element in rural 
s o c i e ty ,  an acce lerat ion  o f  p o la r iza t ion  o f  the c la sse s ,  
and an undermining o f  the p o l i t i c a l  in f luence  o f  the
b ig  land l o r d s ,  ^
The. Sov ie t  Union encouraged the 'White Revolution '  
at the expense o f  the ir  support to the communists in 
Iran. In the process ,  the Shah found a market fo r  
I ran 's  gas outside the c a p i t a l i s t  world and another 
source o f  economic and t e ch n o lo g i ca l  aid in acce lerat ing  
the 'White Revolutions '  programme o f  heavy in d u s t r i a l i s a -  
t i o n ^  During the period 1962-68 pragmatism d ictated  Ira­
n ian -Sov ie t  r e la t i o n s .  But this  phase o f  co -operat ion  
and good neighbourliness did not l a s t .
In the la te  1960s, p o l i t i c a l  developments in the 
region influenced the Iranian-Soviet  r e la t ion s»  In a 
coup in 1968, the Baath party assumed power in Iraq,
The new Baathist  regime in Iraq faced insurrect ion  at 
home from the Kurdish minority seeking greater  autonomy»
The Kurds were ge t t in g  support from Iran» Furthermore,
Iran and Iraq had a dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab which 
Iraq claine d to be an in teg ra l  part o f  i t s  t e r r i t o ry »
This led Teheran on A pr i l  16, 1969» to dec lare  the 1937 
trea ty ,  which had been f o i s t e d  on Iran by a B r i t i s h -  
c o n tro l led  Iraq, nu ll  and vo id .  Iran contended that 
Iraq did not adhere to the treaty as i t  had f a i l e d  to 
conclude a convention f o r  maintaining the n a v ig a b i l i t y
[Ki O r~l
of  the estuary fo r^ th ir ty  two years .  Teheran was
o o 9
9
in creas ing ly  be coming more assertive  in reg iona l  
p o l i t i c s  and the Iranian ^uest f o r  dominance clashed 
with Iraq'  s ambitious in * the Persian Gulf region.
Iraq and Soviet  Union signed a f i f t e e n  year treaty  
o f  f r ien dsh ip  and Co-operation on 9th A p r i l ,  1972. By 
the trea ty  both the countr ies  undertook to strenghen the 
defence c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  each other. The Soviet  Union 
supplied^rms to Iraq in 1972, 1973 and increasingly  in 
1974. It also provided s u r f a c e - t o - a i r  m iss i le s  to 
defend Iraqi troops against  Iranian a ir  ra ids .  As the 
1972 t rea ty  in s t i t u t io n a l i z e d  Soviet  Iraqi  cooperat ion ,  the 
c o n f l i c t  between Iran and Iraq became an important 
f a c t o r  in S ov ie t - Iran  r e la t io n s .
Shah's p o l i cy  in the reg ion  o f  the Persian Gulf .was
g re a t ly ' in f lu e n c e d  by the fe a r  from Arab radica lism.
"He did not  be l ieve  that Soviet  troops would enter  Iran
d i r e c t l y  aid this  made him s ta t io n  fewer fo r ce s  on the
Sov ie t  border. However, he was o f  the opinion that the
Soviets were acting against him i n d i r e c t l y ,  attempting to
e n c i r c le  him by using the rad ica l  f o r c e s  in the region
as p ro x ie s .  He saw a danger to himself  in Egypt's heavy
involvement, u n t i l  mid 1967, in the c i v i l  war in Yemen,
and in the S o v ie t ' s  strenghening o f  Iraq and Afghanistan»
Also the revo lt  in the Dhofar province o f  Oman was, in his
view, an attempt to s t a r t  over-throwing regimes in the west
of  the Gulf and then turn against him0 He was afra id
that the B r i t i s h  withdrawal from Aden and the planned
withdrawal from Eastern Arabia would leave a vacuum, with
re d ic a l  Arab f o r c e s  backed by Soviet  aid try ing  to f i l l
i t .  This made him decide to strengthen Iran, making i t
a strong reg iona l  power able  to defend i t s e l f  against any
))
combination of  l o c a l  f o r c e s .  zq
To this  end, Iran set  about e s ta b l i s h in g  re la t ion s  
with a major power in the Asian reg ion ,  i . e .  China» The 
1969 Brezhnev proposal f o r  creating an Asian c o l l e c t i v e  
secu r ity  system, which despite  Soviet  d en ia ls ,  was 
c l e a r ly  aimed at i s o la t in g  China in Asia, was turned down
o o 1 0
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by the Shah. In return, the Chinese withdrew aid to the 
P eop le 's  Democratic Republic o f  Yemen (PDRY) and the 
Dhofari rebe ls  in Oman. Iran established good re la t ion s  
with China in 1971. Normalization of r e la t io n s  between 
China and Iran took place due to fea r  from the Soviet 
Union as w e l l  as the detente between the US and USSR.3°
Prom 1974 onwards I ra n 's  re la t io n s  with the Soviet  
Union entered a phase o f  h o s t i l i t y .  The Shah, con f ident  
o f  h is  p o s i t i o n ,  a f te r  the success/6f the white Revolution 
and the increasing o i l  wealth that Iran came to acquire 
a f t e r  the 1 973  quadrupling o f  o i l  p r i c e s ,  had s ig n i f i c a n t ly  
enlarged his m il i tary  programne s and this clashed with 
the Soviet  expectat ions  o f  a d o c i l e  and complaint 
neighbour.
The Soviet  Union added to the tense r e la t ion s  by
arming Iraq which was fa s t  becoming a threat to Iran's
p o te n t ia l  hegemonial role  in the Persian Gulf reg ion .
During the late  1970s the Soviets  were also heavily
involved in Afghanistan. I ra n 's  p o l i c i e s  in the Persian
Gulf alongwith i t s  agreement with the US permitting the
establishment o f  American reconnaissance s ta t ion s  near 
*  31the Dovietr'border further  antagonized the S o v ie ts .
4
Moreover, the Soviet  Union considered Iran 's  
extensive arms deals  with the US an d other Vie s te m  
nations as exceeding the leg it im ate  defence requirements 
o f  Iran. It even viewed th is  massive acquiring o f  arm3 
by Iran a3 a source o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  in the region 0 The 
Sov iets  appeared cautious and restra ined ,  y e t  warned 
Iran about "the consequences o f  a continued arms bu i ld ing  
in 1973, 1974 and 1976".32-
The establishment o f  d i fp lom at ic  r e la t ion s  between 
Iran and China in August 1971 created another area o f  
Iranian-Soviet  d i s c o r d .  China's anti -Sov ie t ism  co n d i t i o n ­
ed Iranian-Soviet  r e la t io n s  t i l l  1973» The Chinese 
Foreign Minister  Chi Peng Pe i ,  on a v i s i t  to Teheran in 
June 1973 endorsed the massive Iranian arms builUp in 
order to negate the S ov ie t  role  in the r e g io n .^  During 
h is  v i s i t  to Teheran in 1978, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Huang Hua, suggested that the th ird  world 
countr ies  should unite with Western nations against the
oo11
Sov iet  Union which was the common enemy. In August 
1978, both Iran and China, expressed the ir  concern 
over the communist coup in Afghanistan and the s i tua t ion  
in the PDJRY when the Chinese communist Party Chairman 
Hua-Kuo Feng v i s i t e d  Iran The S ov ie t  Union c r i t i c i s e d  
these Chinese v i s i t s  to Iran and considered them as part 
o f  increasing Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf 
region to the detriment o f  Soviet  U n io n .^
At the reg iona l  l e v e l ,  Iran sought to play the role  
o f  a policeman. On 30 November, 1971, in order to 
c o n tro l  the Gulf entrances and secure free  navigation 
in the Gulf, Iran occupied the two Tumb and the Abu 
Musa is lands  located  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  c lose  to the narrow 
entrance to the s t r a i t  o f  Hormuz.3» 1 Iran p a tro l led  the* UurdL
s t r a i t  of  Hormuz and between 1972 and 1975 helped Oman 
suppress the Dhofari rebe ls  who operated with Soviet  
supplies  from sanctuary in the PDHY',37
Moreover, the Shah's proposal o f  a common market 
f o r  1he Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l  states  was a d i r e c t  
counter to Brezhnev's proposal to  develop an Asian 
c o l l e c t i v e  secur ity  system. The Shah a lso  sought to 
undermine Soviet  influence in the region by providing 
economic assistance to India and Afghanistan. Iran also  
supported President Sadat in the Middle East and Somalia 
in the HorUn o f  Afr ica to atta in  the same o b je c t iv e .
At the in ternat iona l  l e v e l ,  the Ameyrian defeat  in 
Vietnam had prompted the enunciation o f  the Nixon Doctrine 
o f  August 1969. The doctrine  stated that the "US would 
not intervene d i r e c t l y  on behalf  o f  f r i e n d ly  states  but 
would provide them with the wherewithal to defend th e ir  
own (and presumably US) nat iona l  in te re s ts "  Hence the 
Shah, already asp ir ing  to dominate jba the Persian Gulf , 
assumed the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  p ro te c t in g  Iranian and 
American in te r e s ts  there.
The p o l i t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  that emerged between Iran 
and the Soviet  Union did not hinder the development o f  
economic cooperation between them0 'B i l a t e r a l  trade in 
1977 exceeded $ 1 b i l l i o n  and was growing rapidly  so 
that by the end o f  the year ,  Iran was USSR's largest  
non -m il i tary  trading partner in the third w or ld ' The
11
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Soviet  Union, towards the end of  1978, has ranked f i r s t  
in Iranian exports  (excluding o i l ) . ^ 0
These trade re la t ions  proved to be a stabilizing 
influence on the i r  r ela t i  on3 0 Despite the growing p o l i t i c a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  the Sov ie t  Union maintained a certa in  l e v e l  
o f  support to the Shad's regime, obviously d ic ta ted  by 
national  in teres t»
Iran 's  r e la t ion s  with the Soviet  Union during the 
Shah's period can be e f f e c t i v e l y  summarized in Rubinste in 's  
word s :
"The Soviet Union and Iran dea lt  with each other on 
the basi3 o f  mutual advantage. Despite d i f f e r e n t  systems 
and a n t i t h e t i c a l  id e o lo g ie s  they developed valued economic 
r e la t io n s ,  kept the ir  border qu iet ,  and handled the ir  
reg iona l  r iv a l ry  pragmatical ly and prudently» Each 
derived considerable  b en e f i t  from the normalized 
re la t ions '  ' . i n
The revo lut ion  in Iran, in ea^rly 1979, had caught 
many unawares and the Sov iet  Union was no exception .
During the c i v i l  s t r i f e  at the end o f  the Shah's ru le ,  
the S ov ie t  Union did not c r i t i c i z e  his  regime probably 
an t i c ip a t in g  the Shah's capacity  to conso l idate  his 
power. Yet once i t  was c le a r  that the °hah wa3 lo s in g  
ground and that Ayatollah Rouhalla Khomeini was to lead 
Iran , the S ov ie ts  switched their  support
to him. This was manifested in the t o t a l  support given 
to the Islamic revolut ion  in i t 3 f i n a l  phase by the pro-  
Moscow Tudeh party.
The Soviet  att itude c l e a r ly  exhibited  that
i r resp ect iv e  o f  the na ture^jf i t s  leadership ,  a stable
and non-aligned Iran is  abso lute ly  v i t a l  to Soviet  
se cu r i ty .
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CHAPTER - I I
REVOLUTIONARY'IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE 
SOVIET UNION - FEBRUARY 1979 to DECEMBER 1979
The first  chapter served as a background 
to the period under study«. It traced the deve­
lopment cf Iranian-Soviet relations since the 
end of the Second World War. An assessment of 
Iranian-Soviet relations since the overthrow of 
the Shah would not be complete without first  eva­
luating the course of his downfall.
The Iranian revolution, which came as a 
surprise to most observers of the country's p oli­
tics, was the culmination of a process which had 
been building up for about twenty five years» The 
Iranian society was beset with problems of social, 
economic and political develoipent. The policies of 
the Shah did little to improve the socio-eoonomic 
conditions of most Iranians0 Though the 'White 
Revolution' brought about 3ome changes in the society, 
it met with opposition from the religious leaders.
In the early 1960s, Ayatollah Khomeini led the oppo­
sition against the Shah's socio-economic programme, 
specially the land refer m policies . The communists 
also joined the opposition and called for the adop­
tion of a socialistic  path of development,, The oil 
wealth was not utilised to generate employment in all 
sectors of the Iranian economy.. Instead, much of it 
was used to buy the most sophisticated military 
hardware. Also, the heavy investment in military- 
ware did not provide much anployment to the Iranians 
as American personnel were brought in to maintain 
these sophisticated a r ^ s «
Over and above this the Shah presided over a 
highly centralized political system. There was, 
for a time, some semblance of a two party system in 
the country but the two partiep Iran-e-Novi*n and
( c o n t d . . . / 2 )
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Mardom, were merged into one in early 1975°
The new party was called National Resurgence 
Party and the Shah banned all other parties»
The Shah maintained absolute control of the po­
l it ic a l  rei^s by 'cultivating  a politics of 
d istrust ' through his extremely brutal security 
system, the SAVAK.
Towards the late 1970s, the Shah was in ­
fluenced into taking measures to liberalize  his 
governance o President Carter, in pursuing his 
human rights campaign, brought pressure on the 
Shah. Domestically, too, there were many demands 
for political  reforms. At the same time, the 
effects of his Western 6riented economic reforms 
and planning, under the so-calle d White Revolution, 
were very apparent. The implementation of the land 
reforms and other agrarian refoims led to social 
and economic displacements. The agrarian and edu­
cational reforms attacked the material base of the 
clergy and this gave them a concrete reason to 
oppose the Shah. The rising  inflation and other 
social and economic hardships created tremendous 
di^atisfaction  among the Iranian masses. This 
feeling of insecurity was gradually building up 
and found an outlet when the Shah undertook the 
'l iberalization  measures'.
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION:
The protest movement against the Shah started 
in early 1978 when a »ember of demonstrations 
were held in major Iranian c it ies . Active oppo­
sition to the Shah was propagated by the urban 
middle class and the students. By mid-January, 
the religious leaders mobilised the urban poor 
and from February onwards a riajmber of street 




the rising opposition, the Shah had to impose 
martial law by September 1978. After facing 
three months of intense agitation, when the 
Iranian economy was almost brought to a standstill 
through the strikes in the oil industry and other 
sectors, the Snah was pursuaded to leave his 
country by the Garter administration. The Shah 
left Iran on '16 January 1979, and on 10-11 Feb­
ruary a mass uprising put Khomeini's followers in 
power« ^
Apart 'from it being a p olitical  and social re' 
volt, the Iranian revolution had a distttpt ideolo­
gical flavour, in that it v/as extremely nationalistic ,
protesting against the 'imposition of Western ad-
2.
visers and culture upon Ir a n ' .
Khomeini's ascendancy in the Iranian political 
set up signified the prevalence of traditional, 
conservative elements that had succeeded in giving 
direction to the rev)lution. The clergy was respon­
sible in organizing political  opposition and mobi­
lizing thie masses. Khomeini led all sections of 
the population into a United Front which included 
the middle bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeo­
isie , artisans and small scale tradesmen as well 
as the industrial proletariat, students and pea­
sants.^ The intelligentsia was influenced by secu­
larism and foreign philosophies like Communists, 
Socialists , nationalists and the Liberal democrats,»
The working classes under the influence of such 
leftist  groups like Mujahidean -e-Khalq and Fedayeen-e- 
Khalq and the Tudeh were limited in strength as there 
was a ban on their activities during the Shah's period0 
Yet these parties were successful in organising the 
workers of the Ahwaz oilfields  and the Abadan r e fi­
nery. All shades of political opposition found
(contd o.../4)
-  k  -
expression and articulation in Khomeini's anti- 
Shah and a n t i - U S  pronouncements0
The Soviet Union, which had cultivated quite 
a stable economic relationship with the Shah over 
the previous fifteen years, was in it ia lly  relun- 
tant to support the opposition movement, which do­
minated as it was by the Ulama, was considered by 
the Soviets to be ideologically incompatible . But 
Khomeini's pronounced anti-Americanism and anti- 
Westerpinism encouraged Moscow to lend vocal support 
to the protest movement. The pro-Moscow Tudeh gave 
a call for the fo rmation of a United Front to over­
throw the monarchy and joined the anti-Shah movement 
in late 1978. The Tudeh party aclcnowls dged Kho- 
m ieni's  leadership as it was mainly anti-imperialistic0
Moscow openly supported the Iranian opposi­
tion to the Shah in late 1978. To appease the 
opposition, the Shah had removed some of hSs un­
popular officials  and released many political  pri­
soners, He also assured elections and promised a
c
Western style democracy for Iran? The Soviet Union 
disliked the proposition for a Western type of de­
mocracy as it implied more Western and American 
influence in Iran. It condemned the Shah for his 
pro-imperialist policies and charged the US of in­
terference in Iranis internal matters.- Throughout 
the cris is , the Shah waited for signals fit>m 
America and the Soviet Union took a serious view 
of t h is 0^  In a statement in Prav«da on November 
19, 1978, the Sovliet leader Leonid Brezhnev/ warned 
the US that "any (intervention), particularly mi­
litary, interference in the affairs of Iran, a 
state directly bordering on the Soviet Union, would 
be regarded by the Soviet Union as affectia^  its 
security interests" 7 (Vwtfi i  j> 4-7.) Moscow also 
warned the US against suppressing the opposition 
through military actiono Referring to these sta­
tements later on, the Soviet Union tried to take 
credit of having protected the Iranian revolution $
(contd o .o / 5 )
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After assuming power, the Islamic regime was 
also tolerant of the Marxist elements for reasons of 
political expediency, as it had to hold the various 
sections* together in its bid to consolidate itself. 
Although making clear the regime's opposition to 
Marxism* Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, then Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of Revolutionary Affairs, was 
quoted as saying, "We are Moslems and we have a 
monotheistic view of the world. In such a movement 
there is no room for non-Islamic or anti-Islamic 
creeds. Marxism, based on dialectical materialism, 
is fundamentally opposed to the Islamic vision, 
especially in economic, political and social fields. 
Any effort to reconcile the£e two doctrines is 
doomed to failure. However, in the Islamic State 
Marxists will have the right to express their 
opinion."
This statement was consistent with Khomeini's 
earlier declaration, before assuming power that 
"the Marxists will be free (in the Islamic society 
of Iran) to express their opinion, for we are convinced 
u»vi<*werl that Islam has all the answers our people 
need . . . .  we have never denied them their 
freedom or infringed upon it. Everyone is free to 
express his opinion, but not to conspire"./0
Hence the Tudeh party, alongwith other leftist 
groups, was allowed to function in the post revolu­
tionary atmosphere.
Following the declaration of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran on 1st April, 1979, one of the 
first governments to express immediate recognition 
was that of the Soviet Union.
President Brezhnev congratulated Ayatollah 
Khomeini on tlie proclamation of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and 'confirmed that the policy of the USSR
Contd...p/5
vis-a-vis Iran is one of sincere friendship and good 
neighbourliness 1. Khomeini's first meeting with a 
foreign envoy was with Soviet ambassador Vladimir 
M. Vinogradov on 25th February, 1979,M
KHOMEINI'S FOREIGN POLICY STANCE:
The change of government in Iran introduced an 
element of uncertainty in the domestic politics and 
a lack of a distinct foreign policy. For the first 
time, since the Second World War, the situation in 
Iran provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to 
exercise its influence. The Soviet expectations of 
good-neighbourly:relations were fulfilled to the 
extent that Khomeini's non-aligned, extremely 
nationalistic policies were to their advantage.
The new revolutionary government under Khomeini 
adopted a progressive foreign policy under the dictum 
'Neither East, Nor West'. Iran became a member of the 
non-aligned movement- and opposed colonialism and 
discrimination. It advocated independence, peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation with the third world 
countries.
In order to gain support and consolidate his 
authority, Khomeini continued with his anti-US 
policies. His extreme anti-Westernism demonstrated 
to his supporters the conviction that he wanted 
Iran to be truely independent. The Iranian govern­
ment drastically altered the 'politico-strategic 
orientation' of the Shah's policies. This process 
of Ide-’Westernization' was considered to be extremely 
beneficial by the Soviet Union,
Iran expelled multinational cooperations and 
undertook measures for larg e scale nationalization 
and the cancellation of major contracts involving 
foreign companies. This included the cancellation 
of the construction of a pipeline which was to 
supply the Soviet Union and other European countries
Contd...p/7
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with natural gas. The U.S. was asked to close its 
monitoring posts on the Soviet-Iranian border and 
Iran disallowed any further electronic surveillance 
by the U.S.A. According to the Draft constitution 
which was officially published on June 18, 1979, 
and which clearly voiced the Ayatollah's non-aligned 
foreign policy, no foreign military bases were 
to be allowed in Iran under any circumstances'The 
emx^loyment of foreign experts and consultants 
would require parliamentary approval'.^
Iran withdrew from CENTO, thereby breaking the 
American sponsored security system in the region.
And 'on March b, 1979, it was announced that a 
proposed naval base under construction at Shah 
Bahar (on the Gulf of Oman) would be converted into 
a fishing harbour as Iran would no longer play the 
role of policeman on the Persian Gulf.^
Iran came closer to those Arab nations which 
were anti-American. It broke off all relations 
with Israel and recognized the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), handing over to 
it the Israeli embassy. Iran severed diplomatic 
connection with Egypt and joined the Arab nations 
in opposing the American sponsored 6amp David settle­
ment between Egypt and Israel.
Khomeini, in his endeavour to make Iran a 
non-aligned country, tried to bring Iran out of its 
total dependence on the West, especially America.
On the other hand, he established diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union and allowed the 
Tudeh to function within limits.
With this background, in the next few pages, 
an attempt will be made to trace the development of 
revolutionary Iran's political, economic and military 
relations with the Soviet Union in the first year 
of the revolution, until the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in December 1979.
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a - Political relations
The ideological differences between Iran and 
the Soviet Union that came to exist once it became 
clear that Iran was to be an Islamic Republic did 
not hinder the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. The Soviet policy during 
this period was to gain as much influence as possible 
in Iran at the cost of the decline of US position in 
the country. From the beginning it encouraged Iranian 
hostility to the US when it supported the revolution 
in Iran mainly because it was anti- imperialist, i.e. 
basically anti-American. Throughout the year 1979 
the Soviet Union pursued this policy. The taking of 
US hostages by Iranian students on 4 November, 1979 
provided the Soviets with an opportunity to fuel 
further the anti-American sentiments in Iran.
The hostage crisis had dealt a further blow 
to the American position in Iran after the Shah's 
over-throw. The Carter administration was looking 
into the possibilities of having a 'rapid deploy­
ment force' in readiness for any emergency in the 
Gulf region. The Soviet Union considered such moves 
a threat to its security and declared that it would 
not tolerate US military intervention in Iran.^f-
The hostage crisis also provided the Soviets 
with the opportunity to gain an economic foothold 
in Iran, apart from the political gains that accrued 
to them. The US Government, in order to solve the 
hostage issue tried to put pressure on Iran, by 
asking the UN Security Council to impose economic 
sanctions, failing which it went ahead on its own.
The US Government halted the supply of military 
spare parts to Iran. 'On Nov. 12, 1979, President 
Carter ordered an end to US oil imports from Iran'.^
The Soviet Union tried to make the most of 
this crisis by offering Iran to help ease the 
pressures of US economic embargo by expanding 
Soviet-Iranian trade relations. It also discouraged 
Iranian economic ties and cooperation with the states 
in the Persian Gulf which were friendly to the US.
Contd..d /9
At the same time the Soviet Union sought to enhance 
its influence by encouraging the increase in political, 
economic and military ties between Iran and the 
socialist countries. &
At the domestic level, the Soviet Union tried 
to weaken the position of such personalities in 
Iranian polities that were in favour of normalising 
relations with the US. It also strove to elicit the 
regime's tolerance towards Tud.eh and encouraged such 
radical domestic economic policies as the rationalisa­
tion of foreign trade, greater measures of land 
reform, and an increased governmental participation 
in the Iranian economy.1^
The geographical location of Iran adjacent to 
Soviet Union and its sharing of 1,500 k m s , of common 
boundary in the north lias resulted in an ethnic 
admixture, of population along «¿theborder areas.
Islam is the major religion adhered to by the 
Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Turkomans in the frontier
tyvjl
reMgioy^s. With result, the Islamic revolution in 
Iran has a potential for influence across the border. 
The Soviet Union, therefore, strove to maintain good 
state-to-state relations with Iran. It hoiked, there­
by, that Iran would restrain its vocal propaganda 
aimed at the Soviet Muslim minorities.
During the first year of the revolution, the 
Soviet Union, therefore, publicly acknowledged the 
revolution in Iran as being 'objectively progressive' 
and sought to minimise the Islamic aspect by under­
playing the religious content of the movement. The 
revolution was considered the first step towards 
total revolution. Whenever Iranian religious leaders 
expressed concern over the fate of Muslims in Soviet 
Union, the Soviet media usually retaliated by giving 
en account of the religious freedom the Soviet Muslims 
enjoyed. "They tried to prove that no contradiction 
existed between communism and Islam and that Iran's
existence as a Muslim state need not influence its
10
relations with the Soviet Union". ' °
-  2 3 -
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Among other domestic issues, the Kurdish 
demand for autonomy within the Iranian state also 
became a factor influencing Iranian-Soviet relations. 
The Soviet Union had always expressed support 
for Kurdish autonomy even prior to the Islamic 
revolution after the change of regime in Iran, the 
Soviet Union continued its policy of supporting 
minorities, especially the Kurds. The Soviet 
support for Kurdish demands lessened towards the 
end of November, 1979 probably due to Soviet 
reassessment of Iranian domestic situation as 
well as the taking of American hostages on 4th 
November, 1979. The Soviets wanted to demonstrate 
total support to the Iranians and to strengthen 
their anti-American sentiment.^
On the other head, the Islamic regime which
had banned the activities of the Tudeh and other
leftist parties in August, 1979, lifted the ban
HO
on Tudeh on 2 October, 1979 thereby gaining its 
support for the regime's activities.
b - Economic relations
In the economic field, as already mentioned 
the Soviet Union get the opportunity to increase 
trade relations with Iran due to the U.S. 
economic embargo. Even before the hostage 
crisis, Soviet efforts were directed at expanding 
economic ties between Iran and the socialist tloc.
It had also offered economic aid to Iran.
Contd../II
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Prior to the revolution the Soviet bloc# 
countries received only 0 o5$ of Iranian exports and 
provided inly 3» 7$ of Iran 's  imports. Iranian ex­
ports to Soviet Union since the revolution have 
remained at their pre-revolutionary level. However, 
Iranian imports .from Soviet blofc g o  untries increa­
sed to 8 08^ql Iran 's  too al imports in the period 
following the US economic onbargo. Iran's dependence 
on the Soviet Union ao a transit route for impor­
ting goods from other countries, also increasedr*
On the other hand, the gas supply agreement 
made by the Shah to the Soviet Union was considered 
exploitative by the new regime. This feeling crea­
ted, tension between the two countries and eventua­
lly in March 1980 , the gas supply to the Soviet 
Union was halted. Also in July 1979, the Iranian 
government cancelled the construction of the second 
Iran Natural Gas Trunkline (IGAT-2) which was ex­
pected to open in 1981 and was to deliver larger 
quantities of gas to the Soviet Union.
This trend of economic relations in the first  
year of rule by the revolutionary government in 
Iran clearly 3hows the mutual gained from improved 
economic ties given the domestic situation in Iran 
and the international situation after the taking of 
American hostages0
The regime in Iran tolerated the Tudeh's func­
tioning as it needed every suppcrt when it was dip ­
lomatically isolated at the in te m ational level.
It welcomed Soviet economic supper t during the 
period but made sure that the economic ties 30 
formed did not le ad to greater Soviet influence in 
Iran 's  domestic politics,.
Co Mi l ita ry Relations
There were no subs tan tia 1 military relations 
between Iran and the Soviet Union during this period 
but the Soviet Union gained an immense military ad-
^ontd o 0p/ 1 2
- «26-
vantage in an indirect manner. The Iranian 
decision to withdraw from CiSNTO was regarded asof 
great strategic importanceby the Soviet Union 
as it brought about a discontinuity in the m  - 
circlement of its southern bcrder by the US and 
its a ll ie s .  Also the Iranian decision to d is ­
continue close military cooperation that existed 
between Iran and the US during theShah's period 
was definitely  to S ovi e t advantage.
'General Qarani, then Armed Forces Chief of 
S taff , said on February 21, 1979, that the US 
would be aslced to closeits monitoring posts on 
the Soviet - Iranian border and that Iran would 
not allow further ele ctronic surveillance by the 
USA. He added, however, that some contaiijed m ili­
tary cooperation remained possible, inlcuding the 
purchase of spare parts of US-made weapons and ' 
completion of the training of Iranian soldiers 
in the USA0 On March 3, 1979, the General said 
that all services rendered by US military personnel 
to the Iranian froces had been terminated«, ^
The diplomatic immunity granted to US m ili­
tary advisers since October 1977 was abrogated 
on May 23, l979o On Augue t 9, 1979, the Iranian 
government 'o f f ic ia l ly  rescinded its armaments 
purchase contracts with the USA (except for the 
supply of spare parts and specified equipment) 0 
Iran also boycotted weapons from ibther Western 
countries when it cancelled orders, on April 5 ,
1979, for supply of British Shir - Chieftain tanks, 
West German submarines, itagates and/equipment for
3/i
the port of Bushire and naval vessels from France 0
The S oviet Union, on its part, encouraged 
Iranian dislike for the military by accusing it 
of past collusion w. th the Shah and the U.S.^5"
Contd..p/13
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The US hostage issue further complicated 
Iranian-Soviet and Iranian-American military 
relations.* In its bid to influence Iran, Washington 
disclosed on November 8 , 1979» 'that the U 0S. Govern­
ment had ordered a halt to the shipment of $ 3 0 0 , 00 0,000 
worth of military spare parts (already paid for) to
<x (o
Iran until the problem of the hostages was resolved • 
This was to affect Iran later in its war with 
Iraq 0
The Iranian Government, to prevent any military
action from either super power, announced on November
5, 1979, a day after the taking of US hostages,
'that it had abrogated ( i )  a 1959 defence agreement
between Iran and the US and ( i i )  Articles 5 and 6 of
the 1921 treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union,
under v/hich the latter was authorized to send troops
into I ran in the event of anti-Soviet forces using
Iranian territory in an attempt to overthrow the
Soviet regiine ' 0 ^7 The Soviet Union had insisted on
the validity of the Soviet- Iranian treaty of
February 26, 1921, despite repeated repudiations by
the Shah as well as Khomeini - It reaffirmed the treaty
on February 27, 1979, two days after Khomeini met
■J.%
the Soviet ambassador in Iran . But when Teheran
abrogated the 'offensive articles ' of the treaty on
November 5, 1979, Moscow chose to ignore the
incident and increased its verbal support for the 
Iranians in their dispute with the US 0
There were no arms agreements between Iran and 
Moscow despite Iranian rejection of US military 
assistance. This may have been due to the regime's 
preoccupation with the domestic strife  and as a 
reaction towards lessening the army's preponderance 
that existed prior to the revolution»
Contd. . p / 14-
The provision in the Drsft-£onstitution of no 
military bases 'under any circumstances' excluded 
any possibility  of Soviet or American military 
influence0 As the employment of foreign experts 
and consultants required parliamentary approval, 
such moves were to be subjected to the decisions 
of the IRP dominated Majlis 0
The November 4 hostage crisis had provided 
the Soviet Union with an opportunity to maintain 
and increase its influence in Iran 0 This phase 
was shortlived as the Soviet military intervention 
in Afghanistan in late December, 1979» made the 
regime in Iran to doubt seriously Soviet intentions 
in the region» The Iranian reaction to Soviet 
activities in Afghanistan w ill  be discussed in the 
next chapter.
It can be concluded that the first  year of 
the revolutionary government in Iran did bring 
substantial gains to the Soviet Union, p o lit ic ally , 
economically and m ilitarily , when compared with 
the Shah's period. These opportunities were not 
provided intentionally but came about as a by - 
product of the regime's extreme anti-westemism.
The Soviet Union tried it3 best to maintain and 
consolidate its influence in Iran throughout 
1979, but was constrained by the limits 3 et by 
the Islamic regime0 Moreover, its military 
involvement in Afghanistan, later in the year, 
prevented any closer relations with Iran and 
conditioned the regime's relations with it in 
the following yearsc
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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRANIAN-SOVIET 
RELATIONS - DECEMBER 1979 TO SEPTEMBER 1930___________
The pattern of relationship that evolved between 
Iran and the Soviet Union since the revolution in Iran 
until the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 
December 1979 was a raction to Iran 's  extreme anti- 
Americanism e Though Khomeini was vehemently against any 
kind of American influence in Iran, he also regprded the 
communist influence as un-Islamic and denounced communism. 
Khomeini persisted in his opposition to communism but 
never found it expedient or necessary to challenge 
Moscow directly on any major issue in the way that he 
challenged Washington.
The revolution in Iran had regional repercussions 
and the regimes of the neighbouring Atates were gravely 
affected by the Islamic propaganda of the revolutionary 
government of Iran. Saudi Arabia, a prominent US ally 
and a Sunni Muslim monarchy, was severely affected by 
the anti-monarchye Islamic revolution of Iran.
Iraq, though tied t o  the Soviet Union by a treaty 
of friendship, had started looking westward. The Ba 'th  
party leadership suppressed the C o m m u n i s t  party arid all  
kinds of religious opposition. A Sunni minority govern­
ment ruled over a Shia-majority in Iraq. The Iranian 
revolution had serious implications for the B a 'th ist  
regime of Iraq. Various territorial^ ethnic , religious 
and cultural issues have traditionally 'conditioned the 
relations be tween Iran and Iraq.
The religious opposition to the Iraqi ruler, Sad darn 
Hussain acquiring a certain di-nension, the potentiality 
of the Iranian revolution to spill  over the boundaries of 
Iran into Iraq, the weakness of the Iranian regime 
m ilitarily  as a result of purges in the military and the 
withdrawal of supply of military spare parts by the ITS, 
as well as the fluidity  in Iran 's  domestic politics , made 
the ruler in Iraq to invade Iran in order to settle an 
old territorial conflict . The details  of the development 
which eventually led to a full-fledged wnr between Iran 
and Iraq will be discussed in the next chapter0
CHAPTER - III
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An other neighbouring state of Iran which was 
unsuccessful in establishing good relations with it 
since the Iranian revolution, besides Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq, was Afghanistan.^
Afghanistan, situated along with Southern border 
of the Soviet [Inion, is an immediate eastern neighbour 
of Iran. With a predominantly Sunni Muslim population, 
Afghanistan experienced a communist coup in April 1973.
In the same year a treaty of friendship was signed 
between Afghanistan and the S0viet Union.
The policies of the new pro-Soviet communist 
government in Afghanistan, were to a certain extent, 
anti-Shah and anti-America similar to the Iranian 
revolution. Yet good relations could not develop 
between Islamic Iran and Afghanistan. The new govern­
ment in Afghanistan faced acute resistance internally, 
which was inevitably characterised as being Islamic.
The Afghan resistance drew sympathy from the Iranian 
religious leaders, prominent among them was Ayatollah 
Shariatmadari.2
Afghanistan, therefore, became an issue in 
Iran ian-Soviet relations since the communist coup in 
that country in April 1978. Khomeini criticised Soviet 
interference in Afghan is tan’S ' domestic matters. The 
Afghan government retaliated  by denouncing the allega­
tions and made overturnes for friendship with Ir a n .^
On June 12, 1979, Khomeini warned the Soviet 
Ambassador Vinogradov not to interfere in Afghanistan 
or encourage discontent in the Kurdish and Baluch areas 
of Iran. Vinogradov den-ied any Soviet involvement,,
When No or Mohammed Taralci was replaced by Hafizullah 
Amin in late September 1979, the event was regarded as 
a hardening of Afghan policy towards the freedom fighters 
and the persistence of Moscow’ s aims in Afghanistan.S
The November 4 hostage issue gave an opportunity 
to the Soviet Union to lend political  and economic 
support to Iran, in the process, distracting Iranian 
attention from the events in Afghanistan. The Soviet 
effort to please Iran was shortlived. The Soviet
-3-
military intervention in Afghanistan in late December 
1979 'in  support of the unpopular and ailing pro-Soviet 
rule in Kabul'^resulted in Iranian criticism of the 
Soviet action.
A new government was set up under Babrak Karma 1.
The change of regime also brought nenrly 8 5,000 Soviet 
troops into Afghanistan. The deployment of these troops 
throughout Afghanistan gave rise to fears for the security 
of Afghanistan's eastern and Western neighbours, Pakistan 
and Iran, iespe ctively . At the international level, the 
Soviet action was highly criticised . The Soviet Union 
maintained that the government of Afghanistan had 'invited 
it to send troops under the 1973 treaty 01 friendship'
7
m  order to meet the external threat. In effect , the 
Soviet Union sent its  troops to assist m ilitarily  the 
Afghan governments4 efforts in combatting Muslim insurgency. 
As a reaction, the Islamic resistance groups called for 
a holy war (jihad) to exoel the Soviet from their ao i l 0 
Iranian^s
Initially  the/delayed their response to the develop­
ment in Afghanistan. Probably the Soviets ba d warned 
Iran. Moreover, the Iranians were not in a position to
<?
effectively act agains t the Soviet Union. Internally,
Iran was too preoccupied in the American hostage issue 
and needed every support,, Though the activities of the 
le ft ist  parties were banned in August 1979, by October
1979, due to Soviet pressure, Tudeh was permitted to 
function. The Tudeh party supported the Islamic regime 
on the hostage issue against the US. Iran had become 
isolated at the international level and needed Soviet 
support«, Khomeini, therefore, showed a somewhat delayed 
and cautious response.
In Afghanistan, after assuming office as head of the 
government, Babrak Knrmal addressed a 'moving letter' to 
Khomeini and blamed a ll  previous problems on Amin. He 
pleaded for the consolidation of 'fraternal and friendly 
Islamic relations' between the Afghans and the Iranians 
with a view 'to administering an ultimate rebuke to the
q
world - craving imperialism and Zionism .' This failed to 
effect Khomeini»
AOo • *T • O
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Though Khomeini reproached the 3ovists an d  cR i l e d  
for their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Islamic 
moderates like Bani 3 adr and the Foreign Minister,
3 ad eq Qotbzadeh were more critical of the Soviet 
action. In a move to balance the m  ti-American 
extremism of the fundamentalists, these Islamic moderates 
vehemently condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanis­
tan and called for inured in te and unconditional with­
drawal of Soviet troops.
On December 2 9 , 1979, Qotbzadeh issued a protest 
saying that 'the Islamic government of Iran cannot agree 
with military intervention by any country in another 
country, especially military intervention by a super­
power in a small c o u n t r y . . . .  because Afghanistan is a 
Moslem country ano. a ne ighbour of Iran , the mi 1 i tary 
intervention of the g o v e r n m e n t  of the Soviet Union . . . .  
is considered a hostile measure not only against the 
people of the country but against all Moslems of the 
world ' . 11
All the revolutionary forces, save the Xudeh and 
certain other leftist  groups, also condemned the Soviet 
action.
In a oo nf e rcnc3 of Is lamic foreign min is ters lie Id 
in Islamabad in May 1980, Qotbzadeh 'sponsored the ad­
mission of Afghan resistance groups and insisted on them 
being given maximum support'. He also became a member 
of a three-man Commission, alongwith the Pakistan foreign 
minister and the Secretary-General of the Conference, to
negotiate a 'solution based on Soviet withdrawal' , but
12.
this did not progress due oo lack of Soviet interest»
Within a p3 riou of almost eleven mon ths, since 
the Islamic revolutionary government came to power in 
Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took 
place, much had altered in the Iranian-Soviet pattern 
of relations . It was not just a change in the external 
environmen t as a result of Sovie t Union's physical 
presence in Afghanistan, but a Iso the developments in 
Iran 's  domestic politics that brought about a change in 
Irano-3oviet relations. Iran 's  relations with the
0 0 * 0 ^ 0 0
3 oviet Union entered a new phase from late 'December 
1979 which can  be broadly analysed under the category 
of p olitical  .and economic relations.
POLITICAL ESLATIOITo
There are several factors, internal and external, 
that affected Iran's political  relations with the Soviet 
Union in this period. The internal factors that were 
important in determining thepolitical relations were 
the power struggle within Iran, the Iranian regime's 
attitude towards the Tudeh party and the Soviet support 
for the minorities in Iran.
Throughout 1930, the domestic power struggle 
continued between the fundamenalists and the Islamic 
moderates o The Islamic Revolutionary Party (1 3P) was 
established by Ayatollah Beheshti who also organised its 
military wing called the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
The thorough organisation of the political  and  military 
establishments of the fundamentalists was an in d lo t io n  
of their efforts at consolidating their power in Iran*
The enactment of the Islamic constitution in late 
1979 and its consequent adoption thereof ter r ©fleeted a 
total victory for the fundamentalists. The constitution 
provided for an elective presidential system of govern­
ment and vested all legislative and judicial  powers in 
a national assembly (M ajlis )  and a supreme Islamic 
Tribunal respectively. The individual rights and freedoms 
were defined in relation to Islamic precepts 0 Most 
important the constitution effectively provided for a 
pivotal role to the fundamentalists in the Iranian Society 
and 'exalted Khomeini as faqih  (an unchallengeable expert 
in the divine law which the government exists to 
enforce ) '
Though Bani 3adr was elected President of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in early February 1930, the 
fundamentalists had extrenched themselves in all branches 
of the government, the bureaucracy and the military and 
were eventually tightening their hold over the regime „
• o O vj • o •
These developments in Iran 's  domestic politics 
changed the Soviet perceptions about the Iranian 
revolution which was in itially  described as a popular, 
anti-imperialist revolution liiisc by them. The ooviet 
Union had expected the organised work ins c Ins 303 to play 
the leading role ns the vanguard of the revolution in 
Iran as soon as the first  phase towards total revolution 
had endedo This did not take place and eventually the 
Soviet Union adopted a critical stance towards the 
Iran ian revo luti on .
The second factor in the domestic politics of Iran 
which influenced Iranian-Soviet relations was the 
attitude of the Islamic government towards leftist  parties 
especially the pro-Moscow i’udeh party „
The Tudsh party which was banned during the on ah ' s 
period was allowed to exist legally in post-revolutionary 
Iran. The Tad eh si on/s with other leftist  groups had given 
fu l l  support to Khomeini in his opposition to the Shah.
For tactical reasons, the Tad ah was the only le ftist  
party which also extended its  support to the Is Ionic 
Republic in the March 1973 referendum. But by August
1979, Khomeini fe lt  threatened and banned all the leftist  
groups, including the Tadeh. The Tadeh, after coming in 
contact with the masses was gaining strength» Also it 
had consisten tly supported the Kurdish demand for 
autonomy within the Iranian Republic, and the Islamic 
regime did not approve of it .  Eventually, due to Soviet 
pressure, the ban on Tadeh was lifted  in October 1979*
In ¡the '."November 4 hostage issue the Tadeh fully supported 
the government.
The Tadeh did not condemn the Soviet intervention
es
in Afghanistan. It acquired when the Iranian government 
decided in early 1930 to close down the Teheran Univer­
sity which was traditionally a major recruiting place 
for the communists.^ The support that Tudeh* gave to 
Khomeini demonstrates the pro-Moscow party's desire to 
survive thereby maintaining an area, however narrow, of 
Soviet-Iranian relations to continue0
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The Soviet Union, apart from the Tudeh, also 
had a sympathetic group in the IRP. There existed 
within the clergy, a progressive group led by 
Ayatollah Syed Mahamud Taleghani which was more 
amenable to socialism„ The views of Ayatollah 
Teleghani essentially differed from those of 
Khomeini as the former advocated policies aimed 
at radical social changes and the redistribution 
of private property. This group derived Soviet 
support but this came to an end with the death of 
Ayatollah Teleghani “ soon after the re v o lu tio n .^  
Hence the Soviet Union could exercise very limited 
influence in Iranian affairs through the almost 
ineffective Tudeh party«, The Soviets believed 
that Khomeini's concept of an Islamic state w ill  
scarcely allow any democratic, liberal or left wing 
party to e x i s t .17
The Soviet support for minorities in Iran a lso
became rn important factor affecting Iranian-
Soviet relations o The Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan created fear in Iran , Iran considered
Soviet military presence around its eastern border
a threat to its territorial integrity. The Soviet
Union had openly criticised  the Iranian policy
towards its minorities, especially the Kurds and
Baluchis 0 It believed that the Iranian policy of
suppressing the rights of the minorities to national
autonomy within the Iranian Republic was the cause
of the minority problems in Iran0 More so because
these minorities had supported the Iranian revolution
Ift
in over throwing the Shah. The Tudeh echoed Soviet 
views. But when the hostage issue took place on Nov­
ember 4 * 1 9 7 9 ,the Soviets lessened their support to 
Kurdish demands,.
• • o • O o o
Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh accused the
I CA V
Soviets of supplying arms and money to the ^ssnds end
of providing the counter-revolutionaries with photogra-
1 9
phs of Iranian military positions. In a letter fo
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, he demanded
the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and
also the v/ithdra^al of Soviet support, for the Tuden3®.
Qotbzad«?h accused the Soviets of organising their fifth
Ct«xcv
coluiTin through i-Hs agents in Iran i.^. the Tudeh and
publishing its views through Marddri> the nev;spapf-r of
, , 2.1 Jthe Tu<«eh party.
Among the external factors, the Soviet in'cen^’n- 
tion in Afghanistan bee -'.me an :ii ip<-»di.ment in th-3 conti­
nuation of 1 normal 1 political relations between Ir n 
and the Soviet Union. Tens ion it-v • loped on account 
of the Soviet action as -'ell as the uvm ual Soviet 
troop movement ne r the Iranian border.' J "The Soviet 
su^jort to Ifan during the hostage, crisis delayed the 
Iranian response to the Soviet military action in 
Afghanistan. Neverthless, with the gradual ascendancy 
of the fundamentalists in its politics, Iran's attitude 
towards the Soviet Union changed. Though the Bazargan 
government had already abrogated Articles V and VI of 
the 1921 treaty with the Soviet Union, on 22nd January,
1930, the Iranian Revolutionary Council declared its 
abrogation of the similar articles of Iran's 1921 treaty 
with the .Soviet Union. Iran felt that the treaty might
serve as a pretext for Soviet intervention in Iran on
23
the pattern of the one in Afghanistan. Moreover, there
were one million Afghan refugees in Iran and they served
24
as a r;>ermanent-counter-propaganda against the Soviets.
The Afghan refugees also demonstrated before the Soviet 
embassy in Teheran.
Differences in Soviet and Iranian p = rspective could 
be observed in the exchange of of icial greetings. On 
3 February, 1980, Brezhnev sent greetings to Afcolhassan 
Bani Sadr upon his election as President of Ir.n. He s-dd 
that Soviet—I ran relations would be V-a«e«l 'on the principles 
of g o o d — ne.i.'j’n’ ionrhness, r-2 ' ** -t 'oi r.nv«r<-• .5 on ty and terri— 
•torial integrity ana. non - i ri t e r f er• • nr• in -*■ -.ch other''"' 
internal affairs' « In Vij -v reply “an.!. Sadr i•••c.i the
O O • • J  o o
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independence of nations to choose their social and 
political order and expressed the hope that the Soviet
Union/ through its behaviour, would not cause anxiety
2 o
to its neighnours.
On the first anniversary of the Iranian revolution 
Brezhnev sent greetings to Khomeini and Bani Sadr. He
termed the revolution in Iran as 'anti-monarchist and
. , 27
anti-imperialist' Khomeini was not too happy with
the Soviet policy of u n d e r l i n i n g  the Islamic character 
of the Iranian revolution. On 12 February, 1980, he 
replied 'any agression against Third World countries 
and Islamic countries, particularly in this region, is 
against the pri^«iples which should constitute the pro­
per basis and foundations (of relations) between nations
Khomeini also called for a boycott of the Summer Olym-
29
pic games to be held in Moscow in 1930.
Iran increasingly came to equate Soviet Union 
with the United States. Khomeini rejected the achieve­
ments of the Socialist societies like those of the 
Soviet Union and its allies as he considered them atheis
tic in character. His belief in private property as 
provided for in Islam was not compatible^the socialis­
tic principle that private property and the unequal dist
ribution of power and natural resources were the roots 
30
of exploitation. Khomeini's foreign policy slogan 
'Neither East, Nor West' meant that 'both the capita­
list imperialism of the West and the social imperialism 
of the Communist World are to be equally rejected'.
On 9 August, 1980, while addressing representatives 
of world l i b e r a t i o n  movements, Khomeini called th^ USSR 
as a big satanic power which is exerting all its power 
to suffocate Afghanistan. The Soviet Union did not 
react to this.^
The issue of Jiplom^tic representation also affec­
ted Iran's relations with the Soviet Union. Iran de­
manded the closure of one Soviet consulate, either in 
Resht or Isfahan, and the reduction of the number of 
its diplomats in Iran. It accused the Soviets of 
spying and expelled a senior Soviet diplomat, Vladimir 
Golovano^ on similar charges. The Soviets denied the^e 
charges. They closed the Iranian consulate in Lenin­
grad and refused to allow the Iranians to open one at 
Dushanba as they had proposed. The Soviet consulate 
at Resht was closed on 20 September, 1980 and the number
of Soviet diplomats in Iran was reduced. This led 
to a strain in Iranian-Soviet diplomatic relations.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
On 13th January 193°, in an effort to bring
pressure upon Iran over the hostage issue, the UN
Security Council, in a resolution, called for economic
sanctions against Iran. The Soviet Union vetoed this 
33
resolution. The US and some O f its allies imposed 
partial economic embargo upon Iran. This created a 
unique opportunity for the Soviet Union to enlarge it- 
economic relations with Iran, which it did (as pointed 
out in the last chapter).
But the course of IrjtiNian-Scviet economic relations 
suffered a serious set bad: Vvhen the Soviet Union main­
tained its intransigence over the fixing of new price for 
the purchase of Iranian natural gas. Iran demanded a five..
Q aS
fold increase in the price of natural*from *75 cents 
per l,OnQ cubic feet to $3.8.0 to bring it in parity ;rith 
the world level. The Soviet Union was not willing to 
pay more than $2.66 per 1,000 cubic feet. Finally, as 
negotiations failed in setting this issue, Iran stopped 
supplying its gas to the Soviet Union from March 1 9 8 0 . ^
Through a complex a “rangement, Soviet Union was
to supply g s to /estern Europe equivalent to the amount
of gas supplied to it by Teheran. Iran would pay a part
of its transit charges to the Soviet Union by delivering
gas at the rate of 3 million cubic metres of gas per year
Despite Soviet efforts to save the project, it was
cancelled. Khomeini considered the gas deal with the
Soviet Union as exploitative, similar to the American
3C
exploitation of Iranian oil resources.
Prudence on the part of the Soviets led to preventing 
this issue from dominating other areas of economic coo­
peration. The Soviet Union emphasised trade prospects 
as well as Soviet role in Iran's economic development.
32
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The Iranian Minister of Economy and Finance, Reza 
Salimi, while on a visit to Soviet Union in April 1980, u 
held talks in Moscow regarding further economic and in­
dustrial cooperation. Hr- also ...asked— for- tran.si t-no- 
j2£iex*feien. He also asked for transit facilities along 
the Volga river water way. The first trade prcbcol 
between the §wo countries, since the revolution, was 
signed on June 20, 1980, after a meeting of the Soviet 
Iranian Permanent Commission on Economic and Technical 
Cooperation, Iran and Soviet Union signed a transit 
agreement on September 16, 1980, allowing Iranian commer­
cial cargoes through the Soviet territory and Soviet 
cargoes to go abroad via I r a n . ^
The transit arrangement by rail, road and air 
between Iran and the Soviet Union actually resulted 
in easing pressure on the Iranian ports in the Gulf 
region. Iran needed alternative transit facilities 
as the border skirmishes between Iran and Iraq intensi­
fied. 'On 17 September 1980 the Iraqi Revolution Command 
Council decided to abrogate the 6 March 1975 agreement 
with Iran and to restore complete legal and effective 
sovereignty over the Shatl-al-Arab' This eventually 
led a full scale war when on 22 September 1980, Iraq
invaded Iran rendering the passage of goods through
k
Iranian ports risj>y for Iran.
Apart-from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistany 
the tension between Iran and Iraq, which developed 
severity since the Iranian revolution and culminated 
in a large scale war between the two regional rivals, 
also became an important factor affecting Iran's re­
lations with the Soviet Union. This aspect of Iranian- 
Soviet relations shall be discussed in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER - IV
IRANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
( SEPTEMBER 1980 - MARCH 1984 )
The present chapter shall deal in part with 
that phase of Iranian-Soviet relations which came into 
existence with the start of the Iran-Iraq war until 
February, 1983 when a major rift took place in the 
relations between Iran and the Soviet-Union. It shall 
also cover a further period of one year from March 1983 
until March 1984 in order to analyse the pattern of 
Iran's dealings with the Soviet Union after:;the develop­
ment of a break in their relations.
THE IRAN - IRAQ CONFLICT
Revolutionary Iran's relations with the regional 
states was conditioned by the perceptions that the new 
regime had of the various states. The fundamentalists 
in Iran called for a region-wide revolution. They 
could not overlook the fact that their leader, Khomeini, 
had been expelled from Iraq at the Shah's request, and 
that most of the Arab states had failed in liberating 
'Palestine'. They exhorted the Arab masses to rise 
against their rulers similar to the way the Iranians 
had done.*
Iraq, of all the regimes in the region turned
2
out to be the 'real enemy of the Iranian regime't* The 
secular, Sunni minority government of Saddam Hussain 
felt most threatened by the declared aims of the Iranian 
revolution. Khomeini's call for exporting the Islamic 
revolution beyond Iran had a special appeal for the Shia 
majority population in Iraq. The Shiites in Iraq have
( 2 )
remained 'traditionally an underdog community and a
3
recruiting ground for the opposition parties'.
Among the major opposition parties, the Iraqi 
Communist Party had for its membership and support a 
large proportion of the Shia population. The pro- 
M^scow communist party which was a powerful force 
during the revolution of 1958 in Iraq was gradually 
suppressed. The Bath Party leadership signed a treaty 
of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1972 and con­
sequently the communist party was instructed to support
Ltthe policies of the existing regime. By 1978-79 the 
Bath party doubted the activities of the communists in 
Iraq. They suspected them of infiltrating the armed 
forces keeping in view the role played by the 'Soviet- 
trained officers of the Afghan Army and Airforce' in
s
the communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978. The 
communists in Iraq were arrested and executed.
As the secular opposition was so strongly suppressed 
in Iraq, the masses found expression through religions 
organisations. Prominent among them the al Dawa al- 
Islamiy^ (D^wa) was a militant opposition movement with 
a Shiite religiotls ideology and leadership. Ayatowllah
M©hsifc al-Hakim regarded by Iraqis as the senior marja-e-
* 6  taqlid of the shias led this group.
The other prominent religiotis group established 
in 1979 was the Mujahideen under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr who was in 'broad agreement 
with Khomeini on the political relevance of Islam and 
the political responsibilities of the Mujtahids'. Though 
the students and graduates who were members of this
iy
group were inspired by Baqir at-Sadr's ideas yet they 
did not profess for an institutionalised role of the
7
ulama in politics.
The activities of the religious opposition 
gained momentum by the success of the Iranian revolu­
tion, Demonstrations against the regime in Iraq took 
place in the Shia town of A1 Thawra, the worst slum
areas of Baghdad, These were suppressed brutally
fuL
and Ayatollah ati -Sadr was kept under house arrest in 
Najaf. In July 1979 Saddam Hussain taking full control 
of power in Iraq assumed the Presidentship of his 
country. In order to consolidate his authority rigorous 
purges were conducted against all his opponents within
g
the Bath and the army,
Saddam Hussain's dictatorship was criticised by
the newly created organisation called the 'Islamic
)
Liberation Movement of Iraq in Europe. In Iraq the two 
groups^Dawa and Mujahideen, undertook guerrilla activi­
ties against Saddam Hussain's regime. In April 1980 
an attempt was made on the life of Tariq Aziz, one of 
the closest associates of Saddam Hussain. The Shiite 
opposition was subjected to an extremely harsh treatment 
and Ayatollah Baqir a£-Sadr and his sister were hanged.
>
'A law Was passed making anyone suspected by Dawa mem- 
bership liable to the same fate. More than 15,000 
Shiites who had been living in Iraq for generations
q
were sent back forcibly to Iran,' These repressive 
measures undertaken by Saddam Hussain demonstrated his 
regime's vulnerability, and also the influence the 




Since the revolution in Iran, tension between 
Iran and Iraq existed not merely due to the ideological 
differences, with the Iranian Islamic fundamentalists 
calling for an overthrow of the secular Bathist regime 
of Saddam Hussain, which found itself precariously 
placed in a Shia majority state. Relations between 
the two countries were also adversely affected due to 
the presence of an ethaic group in Iran and Iraq, the 
Kurds, who vigorously demanded autonomy in their affairs.
The demand for Kurdish autonomy was a common problem
for both Iran and Iraq. Given the circumstances the
regime of both the countries lent support to the Kurdish
dissidents in order to gain leverage with the ruler of
the other country. In early 1970S the Shah of Iran had
supported Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. On 13 January,1975
10
a treaty was signed at Baghdad between Iran and Iraq 
whereby the Shah undertook to withdra^ ihis support for 
the Kurdish iiebels in Iraq in return for Iraqi recogni­
tion of Iranian sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway. After the 1975 rebellion Iraq had granted the 
Iraqi Kurds with their own autonomous region and a national 
assemblyj* However, Kurdish dissatisfaction with the Iraqi 
regime still persisted.
The Iranian revolution brought about uncertainty 
in the politics of the country with all the political
groups wanting to capitalize from the situation. The
KurrlS
Iranian kinds had supported the revolution against the 
Shah in the hope of achieving their demands through the 
new government. The revolutionary regime which was in 
the midst of a power struggle was not in favour of con­
ceding minority demands. Within two months of the change
( 5 )
of government in Iran, intense fighting broke out 
between the Kurds and the Revolutionary Guards. The 
government in Teheran was sure that Baghdad was pro­
viding the Iranian Kurds with food supplies as well
12as military, medical and financial assistance.
Meanwhile the upsurge in nationalistic activity 
amongst the Iranian t(urds encouraged the Kurds in Iraq. 
Moreover, the withdrawal of forces by the Iranian govern­
ment from Kurdish areas of Western Iran on border with 
Iraq, facilitated free movement of Iraqi Kurds into 
Iran for refuge as well as weapons and other supplies.
The Iraqi government bombed Iranian villages to bring 
an end to cooperation between the Kurds of Iran and Iraq. 
The government in Iran protested at tiiese aerial attacks 
by Iraq.^ The rising Kurdish activities in both the 
countries created distrust between Iran and Iraq.
Iraq also supported the minority Arab population 
in the oil rich Iranian province of Khuzistan. The 
Sunni Arab dissidents in Khuziste.n who considered them­
selves as citizens of 'Arabistan' demanded autonomy, 
and further on complete independence. Like the Kurds, 
these Arabs met with intense repression from Khomeini's 
regime. Consequently they adopted guerrilla tactics 
and bombed oil installations. These Iranian Arab 
guerrillas, who were reportedly being trained in Iraq, 
increased their sabotage activities. On 30 April,1980, 
as the Iranian regime imposed increasingly harsh mea­
sures on the guerrillas, the Iranian embassy in London 
was seized by armed Arabs who held about 20 hostages
/L.
and demanded more rights for the Arab minority in Iran.
( 6 )
The events in Khuzistan led to deeper involvement 
of both Iran and Iraq. Border skirmishes took place 
with more intensity between the two sides.
Since the revolution, whereas Iran appealed to the 
majority in Iraq to rise against their rulers, the 
regime in Iraq gave every support to the demands of the 
minorities within Iran. But the major all pervasive 
irritant that existed for over a century, was the dif­
ference of opinion that Iran and Iraq had over the
‘correct dividing line to be drawn down the Shatt a4: (it - 
IS
Arab waterway'. 'The Shatt is approximately 130 miles 
in length and is formed by the joining of the Tigris 
and Euphrates rivers. For the last 55 miles of its 
journey to the Persian Gulf, the Shatt forms the border 
between Iran and Iraq. The Shatt and the region around 
it have strategic and economic importance for both 
countries
The territorial differences over the Shatt al-Arab 
Waterway had been the major issue which was temporarily 
settled through the Algiers Treaty in 1975. At that time 
the Shah of Iran, through fchis recently acquired military 
strength and seeking to play the role of a regional 
policeman, secured a favourable settlement with Iraq.
The treaty provided for Iranian withdrawal of support 
for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, in exchange for Iraqi 
recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab 
Waterway.
This treaty was considered humiliating by Iraq.
The Shah's departure from Iran and the growing uncer­
tainty in Iran made Saddam Hussain review the 197 5 treaty. 
As Khomeini purged the military because of its close 
alliance with the Shah, the Iranian defence was regarded as
( 7 )
becoming weak by Iraq. Moreover, because of the 
embargo, the United States refused to supply military 
spare-parts to Iran. Iran was already diplomatically 
isolated regionally* asd y^t the international level, the 
United States was too busy with the hostage issue and 
the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the events in 
Afghanistan. At the regional level when Egypt signed 
the gamp David accords with Israel it lost its leader­
ship role amongst the Arab countries. Iraq was keen to 
fill this vacuum.
Saddam Hussain, threatened by the Iranian efforts 
at exporting the Islamic revolution to Iraq, therefore, 
thought it the most opportune moment to settle the terri­
torial dispute Iraq had with Iran and ultimately emerge 
as the leader* of the Arab world and the dominant power 
in the Persian Gulf region. Border fighting was already 
taking place between the two neighbours when on 17 Sept.
1980, Iraq abrogated the 197 5 treaty and invaded Iran 
on 22 September,1980.
w a r.
IRAN-IRAQ^AND THE SOVIET UNION
The tension between Iran and Iraq which culminated 
into a fucbl scale war provided a test case for the 
Soviet Union. On the one hand the Soviets were bound 
by a friendship and cooperation treaty with Iraq signed
a
on 9 April,1972, on the other it was making every attempt 
to better its relations with Iran. Initially the Soviet 
Union declared its neutrality in the war as it considered 
the war beneficial only to the imperialist forces. 'Bi*e 
Iranians auspected Soviet Union's declared neutrality 
as it accused the Sovietof providing arms to Iraq. The
( 8 )
Soviet Union maintained that no new agreements have 
been signed between Iraq and itself and the arms that 
it is providing are part of the treaty obligations 
signed before the war started.
Soviet declaration of neutrality in the war was
p.arttij due to its deteriorating relations with Iraq. Since
i
1978 the Bath party in Iran came down heavily against 
the communists within Iraq. Members of the communist 
parbj were arrested and executed. Since the communist 
coup in Afghanistan and the Soviet military interven­
tion in December 1979 to save the pro-Soviet Kabul
\
regime from collapsing, the Bathist regime in Iraq dis­
trusted Soviet intentions in the region. Moreover, 
the Soviet support for the present regime in Ethiopia 
is not appreciated by Iraq which supports the Eritreans 
in their demand for a separate state. Immediately 
after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan Iraq pro­
posed an Arab Charter in February 1980 aimed at preven­
ting non-Gulf powers from having a role in the Gulf 
region. 'The charter stood little chance of acceptance, 
but the timing of Iraq's proposal of it suggested that 
its motivation was primarily anti-Soviet, as was the 
continued provision of Iraqi aid to the Eritrean
* , Winsurgents'.
Soviet-Iraqi relations worsened when on 8th October,
1980, the USSR and Syria signed a friendship treaty.
It was regarded as being aimed against Iraq especially
because Iraq had broken off diplomatic relations with
% 0
Syria in August 1980 and eventually the Iran-Iraq War 
found Syria supporting Iran.
Soviet Union's neutrality in the War and its
c
decision not to supply arms to Iraq w0ir to the advan-
( 9 )
'not to overstate anti-Soviet rhetoric'. The Soviets 
were not critical of Iran and Khomeini also did not 
directly attack the Soviet Union. The Soviets adopted 
an even-handed policy on its reports of the War. ^
The UnitedStates also declared its neutrality 
in the war. The Carter administration which was nego­
tiating the hostage deal also had in mind the supply 
of military spare-parts worth &  240 million to Iran,
which had been paid for by Iran but not received by
1
it yet. Though the b o stages were released on 20 January 
1981 simultaneously as Reagan came to power, he did not 
commit himself to supplying the much needed spare parts 
to Iran. During the period that the Gulf war continued 
and the hostage crisis was not resolved, Iran remained 
isolated from the West.
The Soviet Union wanted to retain its hold over 
Iraq and at the same time made efforts to influence 
Iran. As there was greater potential for strategic 
galas inilran, arms were supplied to Iran through third 
parties namely Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and East 
European countries. Iraq was also* acquiring arms 
through East European countries but the bulk of its 
supplies came from France and Brazil.
The War between Iraq and Iran did not result in 
quick gains for Iraq as was speculated. In the early 
period of the war Iraq idid gain some Iranian territory 
but could not successfully hold on to it. Then followed 
a phase of stalemate for almost one year with neither 
party winning substantially. The Iraqis had expected 
the Iranian opposition to grow stronger but the regime 
in Iran actually consolidated itself. Displaying greater
( 10 )
resilience than expected, the Iranians were, by 
late 1981, in a position to launch an offensive against 
the Iraqis. The Iranians were bent upon exporting 
their Islamic revolution especially to Iraq and remove 
Saddam Hussain. On 13 July 1982 Iranian forces crossed 
over to Basrah which is the second largest city in 
Iraq and has Iraq's major oil installations. This 
Iranian offensive ended in early August 1982.
Almost all Arab countries in the region were 
apprehensive of the prospects of an Iranian victory 
over Iraq. They provided Iraq with the necessary 
finances to meets its war expenses. The only Arab 
states supporting Iran were Syria and Libya and this 
Arab support for Iran prevented a complete division 
amongst the Persian Gulf states on the Arab-Persian 
basis. Because of this the Soviet Union, which already 
had a limited area of manouvreability in the Persian 
Gulf, was spared the embarrassment of supporting either 
Iran or Iraq on this distinction. But when Iran made 
its offensive into Iraq in mid-July 1982 and again in 
September 1982 neither Soviet Union nor Syria wanted 
Iraq to be defeated. Though the Soviets were helping 
Iran they did not want Iran to defeat Iraq or get so 
strong as to pose a threat to the countries in the 
region and make Soviet afod less essential to Iran. In 
such an eventuality the Gulf states would move closer to 
the United States and allow it the facilities for its 
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Syria too did not want 
a secular Bathist regime to be defeated at the hands of 
Islamic fundamentalists. Yet, in order to attract Iran 
the Soviet Union continued to exhibit an even-handed 
policy, maintaining its neutrality. The Soviet Union
( 11 )
called for an end to the war and appealed to both 
Iran and Iraq to' reach a political settlement through 
negotiation.'0
Relations between Iran and Soviet Union by late 
1981 and early 1982 were less hostile. Iran was willing 
to enhance the level of economic cooperation with Soviet 
Union and accept more technical aid and arms from the 
Soviets . Khomeini was influenced by that section
within Iran which wanted Iran to maintain a functional 
alliance with the Soviet Union in order to concentrate 
their efforts against the United States and strengthen 
their relations with the radical Arab states like Syria, 
Libya and the PDRY.^
Soviet Union was also training the Revolutionary 
Guards and Soviet advisers helped Iran organise its 
intelligence and security forces especially since the 
explosions in the IRP headquarters on 28 June 1981 and 
on 30 August 1981, the latter killing many prominent 
personalities including the President and the Prime 
Minister
The Soviet Union was making every effort to utilise 
the Gulf War in such a way that it could come closer 
to Iran without alienating Iraq. The Israeli attack 
on Osirak, the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 and 
the general course of the war made the Soviet Union
20
revise its decision of halting arms supplies to Iraq . 1 
By early 1982 the Soviet Union was willing to provide 
Iraq with weapons through third parties. On 17 July
1982, on the occasion of the fourteenth anniversary of 
the Bath Party Is coming to power, Soviet and Iraqi 
leaders exchanged greetings. They also expressed hope
( 12 )
that the relations between the two countries would 
progress on the basis of the friendship treaty. Though 
the Soviet Union and Iraq were looking for alternatives 
they were keen to prevent any further deterioration 
in their relations
On 1st October,1982, the Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gremyko, in his address to the UN General Assembly 
maintained that the Soviet Union had traditional ties 
with both Iran and Iraq and was in favour of ending the 
war through a negotiated settlement. Since Iran was 
determined to continue the war the Soviet position
appeared closer to that of Iraq which wanted an end to
. , 31the war.
Meanwhile the change of leadership in the Soviet
Union following Brezhnev's death on 10 November,1982,
brought in Y.V. Andropov as the General Secretary of
32.
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The new Soviet 
government under Andropov altered the policies followed 
by Soviet Union since the Gulf War began. It realised 
that Iran had not come closer to it and was determined 
to continue the 'senseless' war which may force Iraq to­
wards the West. Moreover, the Iraqis had been successful 
in repelling the Iranian attack thereby strengthening 
Saddam Hussain's position. Soviet Union now wanted to 
play a more active role in the region and given the 
circumstances was willing to assist Iraq directly. 'In 
December 1982 Saddam Hussain announced that the Soviet 
Union had resumed arms sales to Iraq'. In the beginning
of 1983 a highlevel Iraqi delegation headed by Deputy
n
Prime Minister Taha Yasi'h Ramadan and including Deputy 
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Chief of Staff Abd al-Jabbar 
Shanshal visited the USSR. Agreements on supplies of 
Soviet military equipment were signed thereby increasing
( 13 )
Saddam Hussain was able to rally the support of 
all within Iraq to fight Iran.similar to the manner 
in which all forces within Iran supported the Islamic 
government in its war with Iraq. The Iraqi regime, 
therefore, felt strong and ordered the release of about 
280 communist prisoners and reinstated them in their 
governmental positions. This development brought Iraq 
and Soviet Union closer.
IRAtfS INTERNAL POLITICS
The regime in Iran was getting more popular because 
of its successes in the war. In the domestic power 
struggle in Iran, the fundamentalists were able to elbow 
out the moderates like Bani Sadr and tried to gain more
uj
support. The intense opposition by the M±yahideen-e- 
Khalq which increasingly resorted to terrorist means 
was crushed by the ruling IRP. Thg ongoing war to be 
successful required every support cf the Iranians. Not 
only was the Islamic regime successful in eliminating 
much of the opposition to itself, but the war also created 
a situation whereby the nationalist sentiments of the 
Iranians were aroused and they rallied together under 
the banner of Islam. The fundamentalists were gaining 
more strength domestically as Iran continued its offensive 
against Iraq. The Islamic regime now felt confident of 
its position and therefore decided to put a stop to the 
political activities of Tudeh, a party which was hitherto 
permitted to function in Iran. The Tudeh party which 
until now was supporting the regime in all its endeavours 
became an object of the regime's repressive policies.
( 14 )
Therefore, in view of the regimes 1 irreconcilable 
ideological differences' with the Soviet Union and 
of its opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afgha­
nistan, in May 1983 the fundamentalist regime arrested
the Tudeh party members on charges of spying for the
3b
Soviet Union and outlawed the Tudeh. This marked a 
turning point in Iran's relations with the Soviet Union 
The banning of Tedeh by the Islamic regime put a res­
triction on Soviet influence in Iran through this 
institution.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The war had a definite impact on the economies 
of Iran and Iraq. Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf 
were inoperable because of the war. This resulted in 
an increasing use of overland routes by Iran through 
the Soviet Union especially for trade with European 
countries, Japan and the Soviet Union itself. The 
hostage issue having been settled by January 1981, Iran 
increased its trade relations with West European coun­
tries and Soviet territory was used for the transpor­
tation of goods. Towards the end of 1981 the expansion 
of trade^.led to congestion at the Soviet-Iranian border 
Soviet Union helped Iran in overcoming this problem 
by improving the transport network in the border areas 
of Iran. As a result the transit of commodities for 
Iran through the Soviet Union increased substantially 
from 1 million tons in 1978 to 3.4 million tons in
1981. Along with this the volumeaof trade between Iran 
and Soviet Union touched 800 million roubles in 1981 
in comparison to 671 million roubles in 1978. Items
which were increasingly being exported by Soviet Union
to Iran were timber, fertilizers and steel building 
equipment and from Iran, dried fruits and concentrates 
of lead-zinc and copper ores were being supplied to 
Soviet Union, Iran also supplied 2.2. million tons
-XT
of oil to Soviet Union.
Yet another field of cooperation was opened 
when in October 1981 talks were held in Moscow between 
delegations from TASS (Soviet News Agency) and the 
Iranian news agency PARS. Decision was also taken 
regarding the construction of grain storage silos in 
Iran by the Soviet Union. But the major event in 
economic relations between the two countries during 
this period was the visit on 15 February 1982 to Moscow 
of the Iranian Energy Minister Hasan Ghafuri-Fard. A 
protocol on economic and technical cooperation was 
signed and it included measures to speed up the cons­
truction of power stations at Isfahan and Ahwaz. Of 
the 153 projects under construction in Iran through 
Soviet assistance, 104 were already commissioned by 
this time. The most important of these, the Isafahan
metallurgical combine expanded its production capacity
37to almost 1.9 million tons.
The joint Soviet-Iranian ventures in the cons­
truction of over 100 projects in Iran has necessitated 
the use of Soviet experts and technicians. Alsoy the 
Iranians need to be trained in order to operate these 
projects independently. Cooperation in£job-training 
has been possible through Soviet help by setting up 
'training schools for the specialised workers and tech­
nicians'. Almost 23,000 Iranians havebbeen trained 
directly on the job in such technical training schools.
( 15 )
( 16 )
The Soviets have also trained about 1>000 Iranian 
workers, technicians and engineers in the Soviet 
Union. By early 1982 Iran was being assisted by 
about 2,000 technicians and military advisers from
3#
the Soviet Union and its allies. By January 1983,
according to I.A. Kulev, First Deputy Chairman of
the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Rela-
3 9
tions, there were 1,600 Soviet experts in Iran.
Economic relations between Iran and the Soviet 
Union were slightly strengthened by the ongoing war 
and Iran's need to utilise Soviet territory to send 
and receive its goods from abroad. But this did not 
result in any substantial increase in trade between 
the two countries. Iran continuously looked for al­
ternative markets where it could sell its products 
more profitably keeping in mind Iran's need for revenues 
to keep the war going. It, therefore, sought to improve 
its economic relations with West European countries 
especially Germany and Italy, and with Japan, Turkey,
¿A
Pakistan and China.
BANNING OF TUDEH - A BREAK IN RELATIONS
Since the revolution in Iran, the Tudeh had been 
supporting the Islamic regime in its policies, waiting 
for an opportunity to capitalize in the prevailing 
domestic power struggle. It was permitted to function 
legitimately unlike other leftist groups. The Tudeh's 
view that the Islamic revolution was a first step 
towards the final revolution was an echo of the Soviet 
position. It worked to intensify gnti-American feelings 
within Iran to the advantage cf the Soviet Union.
( 17 )
The $nset of the Iran-Iraq war witnessed the 
Tudeh leading its support to the Islamic regime. By 
early 1981 with the settlement of the hostage issue, 
Tudeh's area of influence within that group in the IRP 
that was sympathetic to it get eroded. Moreover as 
the regime in Iran launched its repressive policies in 
an endeavour to consolidate its position, Tudeh also 
suffered along with theiother opposition groups in Iran.
By 1982 Khomeini wanted to eliminate all groups 
that had played thexroles expected of them during the 
revolution. Heihad allowed the Tudeh to function for so 
long. Eventually eijen the Tudeh's political activities 
were curtailed. Its party offices, property and publi­
cations were seized and the party cadres were arrested.
The Tudeh was forced underground yet it did not join
41
the opponents of the regime.
In June 1982, Vladimir Kuzichkin, a Soviet diplomat 
defected to Britain and informed the British that about 
400 Soviet and Tudeh agents had infiltrated the Iranian 
regime. The Teheran regime on receiving this information 
from the British came down heavily against the Tudeh. A 
number of arrests were made. On 6 February 1983, the 
Tudeh party Secretary General Nureddin Kianuri and other 
leading Tudeh members were arrested on charges of spying 
for the USSR .
The Soviet Union gave a restrained response to this 
development. Pravda maintained that the accusations 
against the Tudeh leaders were of a 'groundless and 
slanderous nature'. It also clarified the Soviet posi­
tion that the Soviet Union was not seeking any special 
rights or advantages for itself in Iran. That it has
( 1 8 )
no territorial claims in Iran and is not interfering 
in Iran's internal affairs.
Meanwhile, on 30 April 1983 in an interview 
on Teheran television "Kianuri confessed to espionage 
'treachery and deceit. He admitted that the Tudeh party 
had been guilty of six errors: dependence on the Soviet 
Union and engaging in espionage on its behalf; illegally 
retaining secret arms caches, maintaining a secret 
political organisation; establishing a secret group of 
officers who beccrne an agency for collecting information 
for dispatch to the USSR; infiltratingthe administration 
and arranging illegal departures from the country". 
These"confessions" were a result of torture as alleged 
in a NVOI broadcast.
On 4 May 1983 the Tudeh party was banned, 
more arrests were made and about 18 Soviet diplomats
LC
were expelled farom Iran. 3 Tudeh was banned due to internal 
political factors, but it was also a 'function of Iran's 
relations with the Soviet Union. It was a reaction to 
the renewed Soviet arms supplies to Iraq and Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan'
The ban imposed on the Tudeh party 
reflected a worsening of Iranian-Soviet relations. There 
persisted certain areas in which the views of Teheran 
and Moscow were opposed. The Soviet Union criticised 
thp Iranian domestic policies for not having improved 
the material lot of^peonle since the revolution. In 
July 1982, the Soviet Union wanted the Iran-1ran war to 
cease but as Iran continued thF war, Soviet Union 
criticised it and made much publicised deliveries of 
Soviet arms to Iraq. Regarding the continued Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, although Iran did. little 
in practice to support the Afghan resistance, Soviet 
Union resented Iranian criticism of xifc its presence in 
Afghanistan ,47
( T9 )
In  the economic field  one major issue that 
remained unresolved was the question regarding the 
resumption of supplies of natural gas from Iran to the 
Soviet Union. Y/henever the Soviets raised the issue , it  
was ignored by the Iran ian s . Instead of shipping the g^s 
through the Soviet Union, the Iranians wpire talking ojf 
constructing a similar pipeline through Turkey to supply 
the natural gas to Western Europe. The Soviet Union was, 
therefore, being denied a vital  economic advantage that it 
could have availed i f  the construction of TG-AT-2 was renewed, 
and gas was supolied to i t .  Moreover, the development of 
improved economic relations between Tran and Turkey and 
Pakistan was detrimental to Soviet interests , economically 
and p o l it ic a l ly .  The Soviet Union accused Turkey and. Pakistan 
of taking Iran  back into CENTO through a 'backdoor of 
economic d e p e n d e n c e ' . ^
Since the commencement of the Gulf war until the 
nhase when the Tudeh was banned, I r a n 's  p olitical  relations 
with the Soviet Union suffered serious flaws. ‘Che Soviet effort 
efforts to gain influence in  Iran  by offering  direct arms 
aid to it  were futile  as Iran  £r refused, the o ffer  . Iran  
feiirt doubting Soviet neutrality  because of the renewal of 
direct Soviet arms aid to Ira.q. Iran  bought arms independently 
<kn the fmris market and. from other sources instead of 
accepting Soviet arms d irectly .
The economic relations were enhanced only to the 
extent that Iran  depended on greater use of Soviet overland 
routes because of the war . Apart from this, there were no 
substantial increases in  the economic relation^. Iran  
consistently adhered to its  policy of not s u l l y i n g  gas to 
the Soviet Union at prices below the world lev el . H!!I! It  
asserted its  independents posture by seeking d iversified  
sources for tra.de. The ban on Tudeh which was more a 
function of I r a n 's  internal politics  also affected adversely 
its  relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet ftnfcxa:
Union was deprived of the platform through which it  could 
exercise influence in  Ir a n .  The Soviets viewed with 
suspicion Irens improving economic relations with Turkey and 
Pakistan and considered it  an effort to take M Iran  back 
into CENTO.
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CHAPTER-V
The geographical location of Iran which shares 
1 ,5 0 0  Kms. of common boundary with the Soviet Union in  the 
north has resulted in  constant interaction  between the two 
countries for a long time. These interactions have brought 
about a d istinct  pattern of felationship  between Iran  and 
the Soviet Union which can be categorised a.s cultural, 
p o l it ic a l ,  m illitary  and economic. Irrespective of the nature 
of the two states , it  has been observed that a certain  degree 
of normalcy prevailed in  the p olitical  relations of Iran and 
Soviet Union which was reflected in  their  economic relations .
The economic relations between the two countries 
began during the rule of Ivan the T err ib le . At that time 
there was nonspecific treaty to regulate the economic relations 
M ill itary  interaction  commenced with the emergence of Peter 
the Greatwho led a movement of Russian expansionism into the 
northern Persian  empire. Nadir Shah also pursued an aggressive 
Persian  policy towards Russia. Katherine and Nicholas I ,  
through their  mil/titary endeavours reinforced Russian sicm 
dominance in  the area. Through the Treaties of G u listan (1813) 
and Turkmanchai(1828) Russia established its pre-eminence 
and carved an area of jurisdiction  in  Iranian  a f f a ir s .  The 
Treatjybf Turkmanchai also established^he present boundary 
line  between Iran  and Soviet Union. Russia laid  the 
foundation of economic relations with Iran  with the 
construction of the Transcffoian railway line in  the 1888, a 
naval base at Ashurda and assisting  in  Ifltithe setting  up of 
the Persian Cossack Brigade .
With the success of the Bolshevik revolution 
an ideological factor was introduced into thr relations 
between Tran and Soviet U n i o n ^ ^ e t  the state interest 
dictated Soviet policy towards Iran . In  an effort to bring 
about normalisation of relations, Lenin renounced all previous 
treaties providing special concessions to ,Russia  as null 
and void. The new rulers in Soviet Union also declared the 
abandonment of C z a r is t 'R u s s ia ' s policy  of expansionism.
C O N C L U S I O N
( 2 )
Anglo-Soviet rivalry  dominated the p olitics  of 
I r a n #since the mid-eighteenth century. In  1907 an Anglo- 
Russian convention was signed through which Iran was divided 
into spheres of influence between B ritain  and Russia. During 
tke World War I the two rivals came together against Germany 
and occupied Ir a n .  In  the struggle that started Britain  
emerged stronger. In  1920 , the revolutionary government of 
Soviet Union supported the rebellion  in  Azerbaijan and forced 
a B r it ish  retreat . The Bolshevifes did not want to provide 
any pretext for further British  expansion. In  1921 , the 
Friendship Treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and 
Iran  with the aim of imoroving Iranian-Soviet relations 
and has served as the basis of their  relations since then.
Although from the 1927 Treaty of Neutrality 
until the 19 35  economic agreements, many treaties wereasigned 
between Iran  and Soviet Union, Iran  harboured a doubt regarding 
Soviet intentions in  t h e r;region . It  considered as offensive 
the two articles (A rt .5&6 )  of the 1921 Treaty which provided 
for the Soviet interference in  Iranian  affairs and thereby
undermined I r a n 's  sovereignty.
Reza Shah who came to power in  1926 made consistent 
efforts  to balance the Anglo-Soviet rivalry  and made Iran  xnx 
independent by diversify ing  hid sources of external assistance. 
He was suspicious <f)f the Communists in  Iran  and banned the 
Tudeh in  1937 .
In  W o rld W a r  I I ,  Reza Shah 's  neutrality was over- 
-ruled by B ritain  and the Soviet Union, who through an Allied  
agreement occupied Ir a n . .T h e  Tripartite  Agreement ( J a n .1942) 
provided for the withdrawal of allied  forces within six  months 
of the close of the ty/ar. B r ita in  withdrew as scheduled but 
the Soviet Union continued its  occupation, strengthened the 
Tuddh and assisted the separatists in establishing the 
autonomous Republics of Azerbaijan and Mahabad.
I n  the oil crisis  of 1944 strong nationalists  
like  T"Tossadeq were successful in  postponing oil concessions 
to any country t i l l  after the war. The Soviet Union and Tudeh 
distrusted ^ossa.deq, criticised  Iran  and refused to withdraw 
its  forces. The Soviet Union evacuated Tran only in  T'la^I946.
( 3 )
The p olitical  relatione between Tr^n and Soviet Union , 
therefore, were at their  lowest during this time and the 
economic relations were n e g lig ib le .  Tudeh was outlawed in  
1949 after  an attempt was made on the l i f e  of r/Tohammed Reza 
Shah who replaced his father Reza Shah.
extremely nationalistic  and independent posture stopping all 
preferential treatment to any of the foi&^gn  countries. The 
Soviet Union consider/ed him as pro-British. Mossadeo*s 
extreme independent policies  and Sovieijunion' s > criticism  of 
those policies  made the Shah more suspicious of the Soviet 
Union. In  order to minimise the domestic and external threats 
#0 his regime, the Shah of Iran  turned for assistance to the 
United States , a non-proximate sape^ov/er which had assumed 
Britain^s  role in  the region.
meant to guarantee Iranian  security . I t  also served the 
U .S .  policy of containing communism in  the region. In  the 
background of the cold war , I r a n 's  alliance  with the U .S .  
became an instrument and issue in  the Iranian-Soviet relations . 
P o lit ic a l  relations between Iran  and Soviet Union during this 
period were conditioned by I r a n 's  pro-west and pro-U.S. stance.
to normalise Iranian-Soviet relations by offering  to settle the 
boundary problems between the two countries and the financial 
claims that arose due to Worldj/varll. A process of normalisation 
was set in  motion with the exchange of v is its  by the leaders 
of the two countries. The changing international context, i . e .  
the emerging thaw in  the suoei^ower relations also contributed
9
to this process. President Kennedy of the U .S .  was not in 
favour of granting much arms aid to Ira n  and pressed the 
monarchy for adopting liberal measures. The Shah's 'White 
Revolution was not imxfKYHwr supported by the Americans but 
the Soviet Union encouraged the Shah's socio- economic reforms 
and the programme of heavy in dustrializatio n  in  Ir a n . The 
V/hite Revolution actually provided an opportunity to the 
Soviets to demonstrate to Iran  the benefits of having close 
economic relations with the Soviet Union • It  assisted Iran  
financially  and materially in  implementing the White Revolution.
As the Prime M inister  of Iran , Mossadeq led an
Ir a n 's  alliance with the United States through the 
Baghdad j?act(I$55) and the mutual security pact (1959) was
After Stalinfe death, K shchev made renewed efforts
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Economic and trade relation* between Iran  and 
Sovit Union registered a tenfold increase . Many important 
economic agreements were signed between Ir^n  and Soviet 
Union. Iran  provided natural gas to Soviet Union in  
exchange for Soviet supolies of conventional weapons0
Soviet Union encouraged the White Revolution at the
c c n s . ' i f  e  * e d  S<Cf-c -s c jl  ¡ u  » v u 'c .
exoenpe of their  Runnort to the Communists.preforms proposed 
in  it  to be instrumental in  changing the Iranian  society, 
w3ch polarizing  the classes and undermining the p olitical  
influence of the big landlords . The Shall also benefitted 
from the Soviet sunnort. Iran  received economic and tech­
nological aid« from the Soviet Union and also a. market 
to sell its gas •
P o lit ic a l  developments in  the region affected the 
good relations tha.t had come to exist  between Iran  and the 
Soviet Union. Iran sought to dominate the Gulf region. It  
declared that £9£S''1937>;3,r?ieiyx 1937 Treaty it  had w**£eh 
Uftfck, Iran to be null and void . Thias treaty had established 
Iraofc^¡ovpreignty over the Shatt-a.l-Arab waterway. The 
/<uYdish problem was another inpediment in  the good relations 
between Iran  and Iraq • The Soviet Union signed a Treaty 
of Friendship with Iran in  197? under which it  increasingly  
armed the I r a n is .  The growing conflict  between Iran  and 
Ira.o became a factor in  Ir a n 's  relations w ith '^ov iet  Union« 
From 1974 onwa,rds Ir a n 's  relation  with the Soviet 
Union entered a phase of hostility  • Iran  increased its 
military programmes, continued its  membership in  military 
alliances like  CENTO permitted the US to establish  elect­
ronic^ data collecting centres near the Soviet border , 
supported Oman against the Dhofa.ri rebels who were being 
helped by^the Soviet Union and the PDRY and continued its 
hostility  towards the pro-Soviet Ai*ab countries like  Iran j 
Syria  and PDRY . Soviet^Union added to the tense relations 
by arming Iran*
The establishment of good relations between Irancw«-£- 
Chinrjalso became a factor in  Iranian  -Soviet relations • 
Both China and Iran  were concerned at the Communist coup in  
Afghanistan (A p*il  1978) and the situation  in  PDRY„
Tran increaded its  role in  the Persian Gulf area
and assumed the role of a regional policeman. ;,vith the
o
declaration of Nixon Doctrine(1969)Iran afctfstrove to
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protect American interests in  the region . The Shah did not
abandon his oro-West posture t i l l  the end. The political
differences that arose between Iran  and Soviet Union
'■f'Kft
persisted due to presence of many irritants^ regional
and international . These p olitical  differences dielnot 
hinder the economic cooperation between Iran and S o v ie W  
Union .Their  increasing trade relation  proved to be a 
stab iliz in g  influence in  their  mutual relations„
The Iranian  revolution brought about changes in  the 
pattern of I rani an 'Soviet relations . Stable economic rela%i 
tions ,that  had been cultivated between Iran and Soviet 
Mk x h h  Union during the past fifteen  years made the 
Soviets in i t ia l l y  hesitant in  suonorting the ooposition 
to the Shah. But by late 1978  Moscow encouraged the anti- 
Shah movement through the -Tudeh.
The Iran ian  revolution which was characterised a«? 
anti-imperialist was supported by the Soviet ^Union on 
account of its  anti Americanism. The foreign policy  stance 
of Khomeini , reflected in  the slogan 'Neither East Nor 
V/est' was considered not so detrimental to the So v iets . 
Iran  was heavily dependent on the US during the Shah's  
period . I t  altered its  security perspective by pulling  
out total deoendence on the US. Tran 's  withdrawal from 
C3NT0, repudiation of arums agreements with US »closing 
of the US electronic data collecting rh  centres near 
the Soviet border »halting the operations of the multi­
national Corporations and the expulsion of Americans from 
key posts in  Tran were welcomed by the Soviets. The Soviets 
gained immense military advantage from the altered Iranian
A
foreign policy  . Tran 's  assertion of independence its  
adherence to non-alignment and solidarity  withJEhird 
World co'gntries breaking of ties with South Africajmx 
and Is ra e l ,  strengthening of relations with PLO^ppposi- 
tion to American sponsored Gamp David accords was a 
position  nearer the Soviet stance in  international 
politics  . I t  appeared ihat the Soviet Union was going 
to make anjimpact on Iran  given the revolutionary situa­
tion there .
The Soviet Union re^a.Mded the Iranian  revolution
as a f irst  step towards total revolution in  Ir a n . It#'
consistently encouraged the anti -American sentiment
in  Iran  thereby honing to influence I m n .  For the first
time since World W&st I I  the situation  in  Iran provided
the Soviet Union with an opportunity to exercj.se its
influence there. Whilst While fihomeini was /pronouncements’"
t
he established d i p l o m a t i c  relations with^Soviet Union' 
pnd allowed the Tudeh to function w ithin  limits's . Even fck
^ • *" * |Y)
through it  anne^red in it ia l l y  that I r a n 's  ant^r- Americ ants 
is  to the advantage of the Soviet ^Union^the development 
of relations between Iran  and Soviet-Union during the 
post - revolutionary phase project^ a different picture .
The ideological factor was once again introduced 
in  I rani en-Soviet relations , when Iran  was declared an 
Islamic Republic .Despite  opposing ideologies , the Soviet 
Union supported Iran in  order to again as much influence 
as possible at the cost of the decline of US position  
in  that country.
Amongst the factors that affected the development 
of smooth p o litical  relations between Iran  and the 
Soviet^Union was thp issue of Soviet 2upnort for Kurds 
and Baluchis . The Iranians believed that the Soviet*- 
Union supports the Kurds and the Baluchis economically 
and m ilitarily  so as to establish  independent states for 
them. The Soviet Union does support Kurdish i
resistance but only to the extent of creating autonomous 
region« within  the Iranian  federation .
Another issue pertained to the appeal of the 
Iranian  revolution across the Soviet border to the 
Soviet Central Asian Muslims . The Iranian  revolution 
has less chances of being successful amongst these 
people as they are p re-»dominantly Sunni Muslim^ and 
enjoy a standard of l iv in g  well a b o v e  th^t enjoyed by 
most Muslim nations . v et Iran  continues its  verbal jsrowgs 
p r 6 p g a n d G t  aimed at these Muslims and the Soviet Union 
continues to strive for good stat€-to-state relations 
between Iran  and i t s e l f .
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The American hostages*issue provided the Soviet 
Union with an opportunity to maintain and increase its  
influence in  Iran . The hostage issue and the consequent 
imposition of economic sanctions against Iran  led to an 
improved economic relations toKirct between Iran and Soviet 
Union and its /allies . As Khomeini considered the price of 
natural gas supplied to Soviet ^Union as exploitative ,Iran  
halted the supply of gas to the Soviet ^Union
The opportunities that arose in  post revolutionary 
Iran  for the Soviet Union could not be u tilised  by it  • The 
Soviet military intervention in  Afghanistan presented 
closer relations and conditioned Ir a n 's  relations with the 
Soviets in  the Jears that followed.
The Soviet intervention in  Afghanistan in  December
1979 was ^receded by a communist coup in  April 1978 and 
the signing of a friendship tr«Aty between Afghanistan 
and Soviet Union . In  this predominantly Sunni Muslim 
country ,the Islamic insurgents ware suppifto,ted. by the
T • «2
Iran ian  regime which condemnjd Communist interference in 
non-aligned and Islamic Afghanistan . Iran  considered 
"the Soviet support to its  revolution and Tudeh'ssupport 
to the taking of American hostages as an<j attempt to divert 
Irani attention away from the Communist takeover in  
Afghanistan and the Soviet Milit/ry intervention that 
followed • The Iranians crit ic ised  the Soviet 
presence in  Afghanistan and labelled  Soviet action as equally 
satanic as the United S+ates»•n '•
The tension between Iran  and Iraq developed severity 
since the Iranian  revolution and culmiri'-ted into a fu ll  scale 
war between the two regional r ivals , also influenced the 
course of Iran ian  Soviet relations . The Soviet Union 
faced an a.v/kward situation because ,on the one hand it  was 
bound to T^aq with a friendship/treaty and on the other 
it  was trying to improve its  relations with Iran . As strains 
were developing in  Soviet Union 's  relations with Iraq ,the  
Soviets declared neutrality in  the war and reportedly stopped 
supplying weapons to Ira.q.
- 8 -
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The Soviet Union considered theyforces and would undermine 
. the unity of the forces opposing imperialism • Tran doubted 
Soviet Union of siding  with Iraq .
The Soviet Union was interested in  ending this complex 
s itu a t io n .lt  repeatedly called for ceasing of h ost il it ies  betr 
ween Iran  and I r a n  and the need to arrive at a p olitical  
settlement through negotiation0 Iran retained its  independence 
by accepting Soviet arms only through third parties like 
Libya, Syria , North Korea , Cuba/and East European countries • 
Iran a!<3£> received arms througWEuropean and V'estern sources.
When /fyvdropov assumed Soviet leadership in  November
1982 , the Soviet Union altered its  position  on the war as 
Iran  had not moved closer to the Soviet lJnion and despite the 
latters  efforts was determined to continue the war . Also 
Iraq was gaining move strength and was successful in  repelling 
the Iranian  attacks . Soviet Union did|iot want Tran to win 
the war against Iraqrand create in sta b il ity  in  the region . Th 
identity  of Sovi.et-Iraqi. interests  since 1 <82 , aroused 
Iran ian  suspicion» Due to internal and external factors the 
Tudeh became a target of the Islamic regime's measures against 
the opposion. Tudeh was banned in  May 1983 and this ma.rked 
itvC the p olitical  relation between Iran  and the Soviet Union.
While trying to improve relations with Iran  the Soviet 
Union confronted certain problems, .Khomeini was tolerating 
the Soviet Union but was highly anti Commuhist . I r a n 's  
distrust of Soviet intentions led the Islamic regime to 
abrogate the articles( Art ,5&6  of the 1921 Tx^gJb^EBK considered 
offensive also by the previous rulers of Iran .Soviet  Union 
believed that the entire treaty was s t i l l  in  force. Soviet
<1 A . _  _ .
Union did not approve of the manra* in  which Iran was dealing
ft u > 1 (y
with its  m inonties , the 1*44id-s and Baluchis .The Soviet Union 
disliked  Iranian  hostility  towards Tudeh and was irked by 
the regime's decision to ban the Communist party»
The economic relations between Iran  and Soviet Union 
received impetus due to the hostage cris is  and the Iran-Iraq 
War» Due to the Economfc sanctions against Tran, Soviet 
Union extended its  help to Ir a n  to meet its  economic 
d if f ic u lt ie s  o
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The War between Iran and Iraq forced Iran to depend on 
Soviet over-land routes to ship its goods abroad. These 
factors increased Iranian -Soviet economic interaction» The 
only issue which remains unresolved is that of the 
supoly of Iranian gws to^Soviet Union» As/Soviet Union 
refuses to pay*^ the price for Iranian gas equivalent 
to the world level prices, Iran has stppped its supply of 
gas to the Soviets»Iran has sought a moYe independent 
posture on this is'-ue and i& taking about constructing a 
similar pipeline through Turkey to supply its gas to 
Western Europe.
The hostage issue had isolated Iran ,but since the 
issue hasb been solved Iran has sought to improved its 
relations with the Western nations» Tran now has economic 
relations with Western ,Efetem and the Third World Countries»
The Soviet policy towards Iran since the Islamic 
revolution was aimed at minimising American and Western 
influence in Iran .^he o p p o r t u n i t y  to attain this objective 
were not created deliberately^anti-Westernism and anti- 
A.mericaru^of the Islamic regime • These were certain 
constraints th-^t hindered the complete utilization of these 
opportunities*, these were the limits placed by the Islamic 
government on the area of influence that Soviet Union could 
build for itself in Iran as well as developments like 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and. the Iran -Iraq 
War»
Tran and Soviet Union had their distinct character- 
isticsy in terms of different political systems and 
differing ideological orientations. But state interest 
guided the Soviet Union and. Ir?n who cultivated, a 
mutually advantageous relationship reflected in their 
sound economc relations»
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